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RUSH PRUDENTIAL HMO, INC. v. MORAN: 21 OR
BUST! DOES ERISA PREEMPTION GIVE HMOs THE
POWER TO GAMBLE WITH OUR HEALTH?t
You never expected justice from a company, did you? They neither
have a soul to lose, nor a body to kick.*
I. INTRODUCTION
"The American public doesn't realize that the managed-care indus-
try is the only industry in the country that has a congressionally man-
dated shield from liability."1 Well, all that is about to change. One hun-
t Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002). The mnemonic ERISA
stands for Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (2000). In the health
care industry, the term "Health Maintenance Organization" (HMO) has been defined as "a prepaid
organized delivery system where the organization and the primary care physicians assume some
financial risk for the care provided to its enrolled members .... In a pure HMO, members must
obtain care from within the system if it is to be reimbursed." Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de
Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans,
18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 75, 96 (1993). "The term 'Managed Care Organization' is used
more broadly to refer to any number of systems combining health care delivery with financing."
Rush, 536 U.S. at 361 n.1. Illinois defines HMO as "any organization formed under the laws of this
or another state to provide or arrange for one or more health care plans under a system which causes
any part of the risk of health care delivery to be borne by the organization or its providers." Health
Maintenance Organization Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/1-2 et seq. (2000). The Court references
the Illinois statute saying:
The Illinois definition of HMO does not appear to be limited to the traditional usage of
that term, but instead it is likely to encompass a variety of different structures (although
Illinois does distinguish HMOs from pure insurers by regulating 'traditional' health in-
surance in a different portion of its insurance laws).
Rush, 536 U.S. at 361 n. 1. For purposes of the Rush opinion and for purposes of this Note, the term
HMO is used as the state of Illinois and the parties in Rush used it; that is, to simply describe the
structures covered by the Illinois Act. Id. For general information on HMOs see DONALD A.
BARR, INTRODUCTION TO U.S. HEALTH POLICY: THE ORGANIZATION, FINANCING, AND DELIVERY
OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (Benjamin Cummings 2002); ARNOLD BIRENBAUM, MANAGED
CARE: MADE IN AMERICA (Praeger 1997); THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK (Peter R.
Kongstvedt ed., 3rd ed. 2001); MANAGED CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Paul K. Halverson, et al.,
eds., Aspen 1998); MANAGEMENT OF HEALTH CARE (Rosemary Stewart, ed., Ashgate/Dartmouth
1998); REGULATING MANAGED CARE: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND FUTURE OPTIONS (Stuart H.
Altman, et al., eds., 1st ed. 1999).
* Louis E. Boone, Quotable Business 224 (2d ed. 1999) (quoting Sydney Smith (1771-
1845); Smith was an English clergyman and author).
1. William M. Welch, The New Untouchables: Why You Can't Sue Your HMO, 1974 Pen-
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dred seventeen and a half million 2 Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) patients have recently achieved a small victory toward forcing
HMOs to "show them the money ' 3 when it comes to providing and pay-
ing for medical care. The United States Supreme Court's five-to-four
decision in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran unexpectedly held that
an independent medical review statute4 was not preempted by ERISA. 5
The decision came as a shock to many HMOs who had become comfort-
able hiding behind the preemptive shield of ERISA.6
Section II, Part A of this Note will discuss the history of ERISA
law, including a look at what Congress intended to achieve in enacting
such a broadly preemptive doctrine. Parts B and C will explain the
complicated and highly technical provisions that make up ERISA as it
pertains to health care benefits law. 8 Finally, Part D will navigate sev-
eral key cases leading up to the Rush decision and explain how each case
contributed to the Court's decision.9 Following the background of
ERISA law, Section III will discuss the facts of the Rush case, charting
the journey that brought this issue to the United States Supreme Court
sions Law Sparks Political Fire, USA TODAY, June 19, 1998 (quoting Rep. Charles Norwood).
2. NATIONAL HMO 2000-2001 DIRECTORY, INTERSTUDY PUBLICATIONS (1997), available
at http://www.managedcareinfo.com/hmo-enrollment-_managedc.htm.
3. JERRY McGUIRE (Tristar Pictures 2000). A variation of the line "show me the money"
that was a catch phrase in the popular 2000 motion picture, Jerry McGuire, used here to mean that
HMOs will have to start paying for medical services that are deemed "medically necessary" under
independent review statutes.
4. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 355. The independent review statute at issue in Rush was the
Health Maintenance Organization Act which provided:
Medical Necessity-Dispute Resolution-Independent Second Opinion. Each Health
Maintenance Organization shall provide a mechanism for the timely review by a physi-
cian holding the same class of license as the primary care physician, who is unaffiliated
with the Health Maintenance Organization, jointly selected by the patient (or the pa-
tient's next of kin or legal representative if the patient is unable to act for himself), pri-
mary care physician and the Health Maintenance Organization in the event of a dispute
between the primary care physician and the Health Maintenance Organization regarding
the medical necessity of a covered service proposed by a primary care physician. In the
event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically neces-
sary, the Health Maintenance Organization shall provide the covered service. Future con-
tractual or employment action by the Health Maintenance Organization regarding the
primary care physician shall not be based solely on the physician's participation in this
procedure.
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4-10 (2000).
5. Rush, 536 U.S. at 359.
6. See Welch, supra note 1. The term "preemptive shield" is used here to refer to ERISA's
preemptive provision which is described in great detail infra notes 22-28.
7. See infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 17-42 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 43-79 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 19
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and taking the reader through the reasoning of the Court.' 0 Section IV is
an analysis of the Rush decision. The first part of the analysis explains
why the Rush decision produced the correct outcome in view of five
specific factors: (1) HMOs should not have the ability to reserve abso-
lute discretion without limits; (2) the doctor-patient relationship has been
destroyed in the managed care era; (3) there is no fear that patients will
yield outrageous damage awards that would cause HMOs to go bank-
rupt; (4) Pegram still stands for the proposition that patients cannot sue
HMOs for having a profit motive; and (5) the uniformity that Congress
sought to maintain is still intact.11 The second step in the analysis is to
explain why some people worry that the decision in Rush is not enough
to protect millions of patients. 12 Finally, in Section IV, Part C, there is a
discussion of recent rulings interpreting and applying the rules supplied
by the Rush Court.
13
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Road to ERISA
Throughout the 1960's, stories of widespread mismanagement of
employee pension funds were common among workers.14 The problems
increased until the 1970's, when it became clear that Congress needed to
get involved.' 5 Congressional emphasis on the need for comprehensive
pension plan reform grew throughout the decade, eventually resulting in
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 16
10. See infra notes 80-128 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 129-181 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 182-192 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 193-207 and accompanying text.
14. Cynthia Ransburg-Brown, The Ultimate Jigsaw Puzzle: ERISA Preemption and Liability
in the Utilization Review Process, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 403 (1997) (stating that Congress envisioned a
comprehensive regulatory scheme aimed at remedying the widespread mismanagement of pension
funds); see also Jolee Ann Hancock, Comment, Diseased Federalism: Health Care State Laws Fall
Prey to ERISA Preemption, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 383 (1994) (stating that pension funds, although
widely used were not required by law to maintain specific investment levels).
15. David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Fed-
eralism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 443-44 (1987) (giving an overview of ERISA's formation, legis-
lative history, and congressional intent). See generally BENJAMIN AARON, LEGAL STATUS OF
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS UNDER PRIVATE PENSION PLANS (1961); M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE
OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (1964) (detailing private pension plan abuses); William J. Isaacson, Em-
ployee Welfare and Pension Plans: Regulation and Protection of Employee Rights, 59 COLUM. L.
REv. 96 (1959) (explaining problems of the employee benefit systems); Ransburg-Brown, supra
note 14, at 414-15 (giving an overview of ERISA's historical development).
16. See Gregory, supra note 15, at 445. ERISA is codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2000). At least five bills in the 93d Congress contributed to the final ERISA legislation. Senate
2004]
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B. What is ERISA?
ERISA is a federal law that governs certain employee benefit
plans. 17  Specifically, ERISA applies to two separate classes of em-
ployee benefit plans: (1) welfare benefit plans and (2) pension plans. 18
ERISA was enacted to "'safeguard... the establishment, operation, and
administration' of employee benefit plans." 19 It accomplishes this by es-
Bill 4 was reported by the Senate Finance Committee on April 18, 1973 and passed by the Senate on
September 19, 1973. 119 CONG. REC. 30,428 (1973); S. REP. No. 93-127 (1973). Two prior bills
in the House of Representatives, H.R. 2 and H.R. 12,855, contributed to the compromise of final
House bill that was passed on February 28, 1974. 120 CONG. REC. 4781-82 (1974). The Senate in
turn passed its own amended version of H.R. 2 on March 4, 1974. A joint conference committee
resolved discrepancies between the House and Senate versions. The Conference Report Bill, H.R.
REP. No. 93-1280 (1974), was submitted August 12, 1974. It passed the House on August 20, 1974
with only two dissenting votes and passed the Senate unanimously on August 22, 1974. President
Ford signed the bill on September 2, 1974. Gregory, supra note 15, at 445 n.59.
17. See generally ERISA 20 YEARS LATER: A LOOK BACK, A LOOK AHEAD: THE
PROCEEDINGS (Dallas L. Salisbury et al. eds., 1995); JOSEPH R. SIMONE, UNDERSTANDING ERISA,
2002: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT BENEFITS (Practising Law Institute
2002); SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, UNITED STATES
SENATE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: public law 93-
406 (W.S. Hein 2000); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Employer-Based Health Plans : Issues,
Trends, and Challenges Posed by ERISA (1995); Carole R. Gresenz, A FLOOD OF LITIGATION?:
PREDICTING THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGING LEGAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ERISA
BENEFICIARIES (RAND 1999).
18. ALAN P. WOODRUFF, ERISA LAW ANSWER BOOK 1-2 (3d ed. 2001). Welfare benefit
plan is defined in ERISA section 3(1) as,
[a]ny plan, fund or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such
plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for
its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, ...
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disabil-
ity, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training pro-
gram, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services ....
Id. There is no need to include a definition of pension plan for the purposes of this Note; however
for further information regarding pension plans, see Woodruff, supra.
19. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 364 (2002) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
1001(a) (2000)). 29 U.S.C. § 100 1(a) states in relevant part:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit
plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and eco-
nomic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and
security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these
plans ... that owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards con-
cerning their operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiar-
ies, and to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure
be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and
administration of such plans... that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum stan-
dards ... employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits;
and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for
the protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the free flow of
[Vol. 19
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tablishing a "predictable set of liabilities, under uniform standards of
primary conduct and a uniform regime of ultimate remedial orders and
awards when a violation has occurred. 2 °
While ERISA is an extremely complex set of rules and regulations,
there are three main provisions necessary to understanding the Rush de-
cision. These three provisions are: (1) the Preemption Provision, (2) the
Savings Clause, and (3) the Civil Enforcement Provision. Subsection II.
C will explain each provision and why poor legislative drafting resulted
in heavy litigation of these provisions. 2'
C. ERISA: A Poor Example of Successful Legislative Drafting
1. The Preemption Provision
22
An express preemption provision was written in the text of
commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such
plans and their financial soundness.
Id.
20. Rush, 536 U.S. at 379. The "'uniformity of decision ... will help administrators.., pre-
dict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws."' See
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 12 (1973)).
Woodruff writes:
Congress sought to free employee benefit plans from conflicting regulations by different
states and ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of
benefit law. The goal was to minimize the administration and financial burden of com-
plying with conflicting directives among states and between states and the federal gov-
emnment.
WOODRUFF, supra note 18, at 20-2; See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 113 (1990);
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987).
21. Rush, 536 U.S. at 365. "The 'unhelpful' drafting of these antiphonal clauses occupies a
substantial share of this Court's time." Id.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; WOODRUFF, supra note 18, at 20-4. ERISA gets its preemption
authority from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. WOODRUFF, supra, at 20-4. "Under
the Supremacy Clause, state laws that interfere with or are contrary to federal law are invalidated."
Id. (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)). Congress may preempt an entire field of regula-
tion:
Congress may expressly state that it intends to preempt a field. Preemption of an entire
field of law may be inferred when the domain is one in which the scheme of federal
regulation is comprehensive and "the federal interest is so dominant that the federal sys-
tem will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."
Id. at 20-4 (citing Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985), quoted in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 334 n. I (5th Cir. 1995)).
When Congress has not completely displaced all systems of state regulation, federal pre-
emption will be found on the specific issues for which there is an actual conflict between
state and federal law and for which compliance with both is an impossibility.
Id. (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)).
2004]
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ERISA.23 This provision provides that ERISA "shall supercede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any em-
ployee benefit plan."24  The preemption provision was called the
'crowning achievement' of [ERISA] legislation., 25 The provision was
meant to have a broad, sweeping and preemptive effect on state law re-
lated to employee benefit plans.26 Despite the statements made by
ERISA sponsors regarding the intended broad preemption powers, the
final draft of ERISA left some room to debate the "relate to" phrase in
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
24. Id. The ERISA preemption provision reads in full:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III of this chapter shall supercede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this
title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on
January 1, 1975.
Id.
25. Gregory, supra note 15, at 456 (quoting Rep. John Dent, 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974)).
Rep. Dent's statement reads in relevant part:
Finally, I wish to make note of what is, to many, the crowning achievement of this legis-
lation -- the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of em-
ployee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection af-
forded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting State and local regulation ....
120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974).
26. See supra note 24 (reading that "ERISA shall supercede any and all State laws."); see also
120 CONG. REC. S29,933 -42 (1974). Sen. Javits stated:
Both House and Senate bills provided for preemption of State law, but-with one major
exception appearing in the House bill-they defined the parameters of preemption in re-
lation to the areas regulated by the bill. Such a formulation raised the possibility of end-
less litigation over the validity of State action that might impinge on Federal regulation,
as well as opening the door to multiple and potentially conflicting State laws hastily con-
trived to deal with some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not
clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme. Although the desirability of further
regulation-at either State or Federal level-undoubtedly warrants further attention, on
balance, the emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the inter-
ests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-
the displacement of State action in the field of private employee benefit programs.
Id. at 29,942. Sen. Williams commented:
It should be stressed that with narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and
enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for
Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and
local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its
broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality
thereof, which have the force or effect of law.
Id. at 29,933. See also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987) (stating the express
preemption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive). But see Catherine L. Fisk, The Last
Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 52 (1996) (stating that while the legislative history of ERISA is voluminous,
the actual historical evidence of congressional intent regarding preemption is sparse which shows
that Congress gave little thought to preemption).
[Vol. 19
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the preemption provision.27 In general, the Court adheres to a broad in-
terpretation of ERISA preemption, stating that a law "relates to" an em-
ployee benefit plan if the law "has a connection with or reference to such
a plan."
28
27. See Gregory, supra note 15, at 457. Gregory gives a comprehensive analysis of the pit-
falls that would result if the phrase "relate to" truly meant that ERISA preempted all state laws regu-
lating employee benefit plans. Id. The theories advanced to interpret "relate to" within § 1144(a)
span the spectrum from very broad to very narrow. See William J. Kilberg & Catherine L. Heron,
The Preemption of State Law under ERISA, 1979 DUKE L.J. 383 (1979). The broad interpretation
would imply that the plain meaning should be used to determine if a state law "relates to" an em-
ployee benefit plan. See William J. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Law Under
ERISA: Drawing the Line Between Laws that Do and Laws that Do Not Relate to Employee Benefit
Plans, 19 FORUM 162 (1983). The narrow interpretation would require a direct conflict between the
state law and ERISA. Id. See also Peter H. Turza & Lorraine Halloway, Preemption of State Laws
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U. L. REv. 163 (1979) (ex-
plaining preemption issues surrounding the unhelpful drafting of ERISA's preemption provision).
See generally David J. Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under
ERISA, 62 IOWA L. REv. 57 (1976) (discussing key issues of ERISA preemption); James D. Hut-
chinson & David M. Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 23 (1978) (discussing preemption provisions of
ERISA).
28. Ransburg-Brown, supra note 14, at 417 (quoting from Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47). There
is still some debate over what exactly should be made of the preemption provision; however, for the
purposes of this Note these debates are irrelevant. See also Phyllis C. Borzi & Marc I. Machiz,
ERISA and Managed Care Plans: Key Preemption and Fiduciary Issues, SF28 ALI-ABA 371, 374
(2000) (stating that "[w]hen Congress enacted ERISA, it intended to retain broad Federal regulatory
authority over all employee benefit plans covered under the Act"); Jody L. Mikasen, et al., 60 AM.
JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 118 (2002). For further Court comments on the preemp-
tion provision, see N.Y. Conf of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 662 (1995), wherein the Court refused to preempt laws operating as an indirect source of
merely economic influence on administrative decisions. See also, Shaw v. Delta Airlines Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983) (implying that ERISA requires a case by case evaluation of the state im-
pact on the administration of an ERISA plan in order to invoke the powerful preemption clause).
Shaw was decided in 1983 and introduced a two-prong analysis: "A state law 'relates to' an ERISA
employee benefit plan if it 'has a connection with' or 'reference to' such a plan." WOODRUFF, su-
pra note 18, at 20-4. Some courts treated the "reference to" language from Shaw as an independent
requirement, while other courts seem to merge the two prongs. Id. at 20-5. See Travelers, 514 U.S.
at 645 (applying a "two-pronged analysis, holding first that the statute at issue did not 'refer to'
ERISA plans and then concluding that it also did not have a sufficient 'connection with' such plans
to warrant preemption").
Nonetheless, if Travelers is to be read literally, it eliminates from preemption analysis only
state statutes that make "reference to" ERISA plans. That does nothing to aid in determining when
a state statute has a "connection with" an ERISA plan; for making that determination, it is still nec-
essary to return to traditional preemption analysis. WOODRUFF, supra note 18, at 20-5. To see a
variety of the tests that courts have used to determine whether a state law is subject to preemption,
see id. at 20-5-20-6. For a more comprehensive view of Travelers see Borzi supra. But see Greg-
ory, supra note 15, at 462 (discussing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981) and
stating that the Supreme Court had already "demonstrated a clear move toward articulating general
preemption principles, rather than utilizing the individual case approach").
20041
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2. The Savings Clause29
After establishing a broad preemptive power, Congress then added
a Savings Clause that "reclaims" much of the ground covered by the pre-
emption provision.30  The Savings Clause reads, "nothing in this sub-
chapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law
of any State which regulates insurance.",3' This means that any law that
regulates insurance will not be subject to ERISA preemption despite the
broad language of the preemption provision. It is this contradiction that
has often baffled the courts and led commentators to suggest that Con-
gress amend the provisions to clarify its intentions.32
The Supreme Court has stated that as a result of the contradiction
between the preemption clause and the savings clause, the Court has
"'no choice' but to assume that 'the ordinary meaning.., accurately ex-
presses the legislative purpose .... ,33 Here, that means that state laws
regulating insurance will not be preempted.34 However, Congress did
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)(2000).
30. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 364 (2002).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)(2000). The saving clause reads in full, "nothing in this sub-
chapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regu-
lates insurance, banking, or securities." Id. Insurance laws have proven to be the most significant
of the three, both in terms of their substantive reach and the number of ERISA preemption chal-
lenges that have been raised. See ABA Section of Labor & Employment Law, Employee Benefits
Law 793-95 (2d. ed. 2000). It is only the "insurance" portion that will be discussed in this Note.
32. Rush, 536 U.S. at 364-65. "The 'unhelpful' drafting of these antiphonal clauses... occu-
pies a substantial share of this Court's time." Id. (quoting from Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656) (internal
citations omitted). See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001); UNUM Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (holding that California's notice prejudice rule "regulates insurance"
within the meaning of ERISA's saving clause and therefore was not preempted by ERISA); Cal.
Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). In Metro. Life, the Court openly criticized the salient
ERISA preemption clauses, stating that "[w]hile Congress occasionally decides to return to the State
what it has previously taken away, it does not normally do both at the same time." Id. at 740. The
Court goes on to say in a footnote that "commentators have recommended that Congress amend the
preemption provisions to clarify its intentions." Id. at n.16 (citing Theodore Paul Manno, ERISA
Preemption and the McCarran-Ferguson Act: The Need for Congressional Action, 52 TEMP. L.Q.
51 (1979); F. Okin, Preemption of State Insurance Regulation by ERISA, 13 A.B.A. Forum 652, 678
(1978)). The Court says that Congress is also aware of the problem and introduced a bill in 1979 to
amend ERISA to provide that state mandated-benefit statutes are not preserved by the insurance
savings clause. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 740 n. 16. See S. 209, 96th Cong.; 125 CONG. REC. 933,
937 (1979). The bill was reported to the Senate but died without being debated. See S. Comm. On
Labor and Human Res., 96 Cong., Leg. Calendar 108, 111 (final ed., Jan. 4, 1981).
33. Rush, 536 U.S. at 365 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740
(1985) (stating that when congressional language seems to preempt everything and hardly anything
at the same time, the Court must assume that the ordinary meaning is the correct interpretation)).
34. See N.Y. Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655
(1995). "We have worked on the 'assumption that the historical police powers of the States were
not [meant] to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
[Vol. 19
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not provide the courts with guidelines to decide if a state law "regulates
insurance" within the meaning of the savings clause.35 In the absence of
ERISA guidelines, the courts have traditionally used two major tests to
decide whether a state law regulates insurance for the purposes of the
savings clause: (1) a commonsense view36 of the matter and (2) the
McCarran-Ferguson factors.37 These tests will be explained in greater
detail in Subsection II. D of this Note.
3. The Civil Enforcement Provision
The Civil Enforcement Provision of ERISA dictates what remedies
are available for participants under ERISA qualified plans.38 This provi-
sion allows civil actions for six specific types of equitable relief.39 Even
if a court cannot figure out whether a state law was meant to be pre-
empted under the preemption clause and the savings clause, it may still
be preempted if it supplants or supplements the civil enforcement provi-
sion.40  The Court has determined that Congress' policy of creating a
Congress."' Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
35. See ABA Section of Labor & Employment Law, supra note 31, at 799.
36. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). The Civil Enforcement provision provides in relevant part:
A civil action may be brought - (1) by a participant or beneficiary -- (A) for the relief
provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or (B) to recover benefits due to him under
the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan; (2) by the Secretary, or by a partici-
pant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title
[breach of fiduciary duty]; (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin
any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropiiate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan; (4) by the Secre-
tary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of a violation of
1025(c) of this title [information to be furnished to participants]; (5) except as otherwise
provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or prac-
tice which violates any provision of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this sub-
chapter."
Rush, 536 U.S. at 376 n.7.
39. Id. at 375-76. The Court goes on to say that the civil enforcement provision "amounted to
an 'interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme."' Id. at 376 (quoting Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)). The ramifications of this classification will be dis-
cussed later in this Note.
40. See Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987); Rush, 536 U.S. at 378. The peti-
tioners in Rush argued that § 4-10 was preempted from creating a sort of "alternative remedy" to
that which is allowed in ERISA's civil enforcement provision. Id. at 377-78. It is clearly held in
precedent that a state law cannot create new remedies that would not have been allowed under
ERISA, but the Court in Rush did not find § 4-10 to be creating a new remedy. See id. at 376-81;
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uniform system of federal remedies in the area of employee benefit plan
law is so strong that all laws relating to employee benefit plans will be
preempted if they provide remedies outside of those provided for in
ERISA's civil enforcement provision.4' This is true even if the court has
already found that the law "regulates insurance" within the meaning of
the savings clause.42
D. The Court's Analysis of ERISA Provisions Prior to Rush
Prior to the Rush decision, the Supreme Court struggled to interpret
each of the key provisions of ERISA. 43 The two main points of conten-
tion in Rush center on defining what laws "regulate insurance" for pur-
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (finding that Texas's tort of wrongful
discharge, turning on an employer's motivation to avoid paying pension benefits, conflicted with
ERISA enforcement); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987) (holding that Congress
had so completely preempted the field of benefits law that an ostensibly state cause of action for
benefits was necessarily a creature of federal law removable to federal court); Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (concluding that Congress had not intended causes of ac-
tion under ERISA itself beyond those specified in § 1132(a)).
41. Rush, 536 U.S. at 375-76. See also supra note 38 (listing the full text of the civil en-
forcement provision). Sometimes congressional intent is so clear that it overrides a statutory provi-
sion designed to save state law from being preempted. See Am. Tel. & Telegraph Co. v. Cent. Of-
fice Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 226 (1998) (overriding policy of the filed-rate doctrine defeated a
clause in the Communications Act of 1934 purporting to save the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute); Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913) (holding that the saving
clauses would not sanction state laws that would nullify policy expressed in federal statute). See
also Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54 (holding ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were intended to be
exclusive). In Pilot Life the Court stated that the civil enforcement scheme of ERISA represented "a
careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public
interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans." Id. "The civil enforcement provi-
sions are of such 'extraordinarily preemptive power' that they override even the 'well-pleaded com-
plaint' rule. Rush, 536 U.S. at 376 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63
(1987)).
42. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54. The Court in Pilot Life adamantly argued for exclusive
remedies under all ERISA governed plans:
The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of
others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress re-
jected in ERISA. 'The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provision found in
[ERISA] as finally enacted ... provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to
authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.' The deliberate
care with which ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were drafted and the balancing of
policies embodied in its choice of remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that
ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive. This conclusion is
fully confirmed by the legislative history of the civil enforcement provision.
Id. (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)).
43. See Gregory, supra note 15; see generally WOODRUFF, supra note 18. As used here, "key
provisions" indicate the preemption provision, the saving clause, and the civil enforcement provi-
sion.
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poses of the savings clause and interpreting what laws "conflict" with
the civil enforcement provision of ERISA.4 4  The following subsections
detail Supreme Court cases prior to Rush relevant to each of these argu-
ments.45
1. Metropolitan Life Provides the Key to what "Regulates
Insurance"
In Metropolitan Life, the Massachusetts Attorney General brought
an action against an insurance company to enforce a Massachusetts stat-
ute setting forth mandatory minimum mental health care benefits46 for
inclusion in all insurance policies.47 These types of statutes are often
called "mandated benefits" statutes.48 In this case, the Court begins the
savings clause analysis by "stat[ing] the obvious," that mandated benefit
statutes "regulate[] the terms of certain insurance contracts," and as such
are saved from preemption by the savings clause as a law "which regu-
44. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 365-386.
45. The decision in Rush stated that "[it is beyond serious dispute that under existing prece-
dent § 4-10 of the Illinois HMO Act 'relates to' employee benefit plans within the meaning of
[ERISA's preemption provision] § 1144(a)." Rush, 536 U.S. at 365. The Court supports this con-
tention by stating that the state law "bears indirectly but substantially on all insured benefit plans,"
by requiring them to submit to an extra layer of review for certain benefit denials if they purchase
medical coverage from any of the common types of health care organizations covered by the state
law's definition of HMO. Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739
(1985)).
It is for the above stated reason that this Note does not go into detail on what cases led up to
the conclusion that § 4-10 "relates to" an employee benefit plan. For further information on cases
leading up to the holding in Metropolitan Life, see Gregory, supra note 15, at 459-70 (giving an
overview of ERISA preemption of state law in the United States Supreme Court).
46. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts 471 U.S. 724, 727 (1985). Specifically, the statute
requires that a health insurance policy provide 60 days of coverage for confinement in a mental
hospital, coverage for confinement in a general hospital equal to that provided by the policy for non-
mental illness, and certain minimum outpatient benefits. Id. at 730.
47. Id. at 727. The term "all" is used specifically to refer to general insurance policies, an
accident or sickness insurance policy, or an employee health care insurance plan that covers hospital
and surgical expenses. Id.
48. Id. at 728. The first mandated benefit statutes regulating terms in group health insurance
appeared in 1971 and 1972 prior to the enactment of ERISA. Id. at n.3. See generally Brummond,
supra note 27. The Court goes on to say that according to the Health Insurance Association of
America, twenty-six states have promulgated sixty-nine mandated benefit laws. Metro. Life, 471
U.S. at 730 n.10. See also Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp., 426 F. Supp.
316, 324 n.8 (N.D. II1. 1977) (citing statutes in 26 states), affd as modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1977). Different states mandate a great variety of different kinds of insurance coverage. Metro.
Life, 471 U.S. at 730 n.10. For example, many require alcoholism coverage, while others require
certain birth defect coverage, outpatient dialysis coverage or reconstructive surgery for insured mas-
tectomies. Id.
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lates insurance., 49  The Court calls this a "common-sense view of the
matter." 50
After the insurers unsuccessfully argued that mandated benefit stat-
utes are, in reality, a health law that merely operates on insurance con-
tracts,51 the Court supported its commonsense approach with an analysis
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.52  The Court reasoned that ERISA's
49. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 740. The Court goes on to say that this "common-sense view...
is reinforced by the language of the subsequent subsection of ERISA, the 'deemer clause,' which
states that an employee-benefit plan shall not be deemed to be an insurance company 'for purposes
of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks,
trust companies, or investment companies."' Id. at 740-41 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 514(b)(2)(B)
(2000), 29 U.S.C. § I 144(b)(2)(B) (2000)) (emphasis added).
50. Metro. Life. 471 U.S. at 740. See also WOODRUFF, supra note 18, at 20-32 (explaining
the two-tier test used in Metro. Life).
51. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 74 1. The Court gave several reasons for rejecting this contention:
The presumption is against preemption, and we are not inclined to read limitations into
federal statutes in order to enlarge their pre-emptive scope. Further, there is no indica-
tion in the legislative history that Congress had such a distinction in mind .... This dis-
tinction reads the saving clause out of ERISA entirely, because laws that regulate only
the insurer, or the way in which it may sell insurance, do not "relate to" benefit plans in
the first instance .... There is no indication that Congress could have intended the sav-
ing clause to operate only to guard against too expansive readings of the general preemp-
tion clause that might have included laws wholly unrelated to plans.
Id. at 741-42. The Court goes on to say that this construction violates the plain meaning of the
statutory language and renders redundant both the savings clause and the deemer clause. Id. at 742.
"Moreover, it is both historically and conceptually inaccurate to assert that mandated-benefit laws
are not traditional insurance laws." Id. "[S]tate laws regulating the substantive terms of insurance
contracts were commonplace well before the mid-70's, when Congress considered ERISA." Id. at
742. A variety of cases have addressed the question. Id. at 18. All have concluded that laws regu-
lating the substantive content of insurance contracts are laws that regulate insurance, thus falling
within the scope of the insurance savings clause. Id.
52. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 743. "Business of insurance" is the phrase used in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. (2000). The McCarran-Ferguson Act expresses congres-
sional intent that states, not the federal government, be the primary regulators of insurance. Greg-
ory, supra note 15, at 468.
Since the writing of this law review article, the Supreme Court has held that an analysis un-
der the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not a requirement to finding a state law "regulates insurance"
within the meaning of ERISA's savings clause. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123
S. Ct. 1471, 1479 (2003). In that opinion the Court stated:
Today we make a clean break from the McCarran-Ferguson factors and hold that for a
state law to be deemed a "law ... which regulates insurance" under [ERISA's savings
clause], it must satisfy two requirements. First, the state law must be specifically di-
rected toward entities engaged in insurance. Second, [] the state law must substantially
affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.
Id. Essentially, the Supreme Court in Miller found that a decision regarding whether a state law
"regulates insurance" within the meaning of ERISA's savings clause should be based solely on the
"common sense view of the matter" used in Rush. See id.; Rush, 536 U.S. at 356-66. Furthermore,
any analysis using the McCarran-Ferguson Act will be relevant only to the extent that it bolsters a
common sense view argument. See Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1479. It is important to note that the deci-
sion in Miller does not seem to be overtly overruling Rush, but rather clarifying what role the
[Vol. 19
12
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 19 [2004], Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol19/iss1/4
RUSH PRUDENTIAL HMO v. MORAN
savings clause, "with its similarly worded protection of 'any law of any
State which regulates insurance,' appears to have been designed to pre-
serve the McCarran-Ferguson Act's reservation of the business of insur-
ance to the states. 53  Under this rationale it made sense to use the
McCarran-Ferguson factors to determine what activities constitute the
business of insurance under the savings clause.54
The Act contains three criteria relevant to determining whether a
particular practice refers to the "business of insurance." 55 These three
factors are: (1) whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) whether the practice involves an in-
tegral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured;
and (3) whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance in-
dustry.56 After finding that the mandated benefit statute satisfied all
McCarran-Ferguson Act plays when determining whether a state law regulates insurance for pur-
poses of ERISA's savings clause. Miller clearly acknowledges that Rush used the McCarran-
Ferguson factors only as "guideposts" to "confirm [their] conclusion." Id. Therefore, taking the
McCarran-Ferguson factors out of the Rush decision would not change the ultimate ruling in Rush.
53. Troy Paredes, Note, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the
Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGSS. 233, 241 (1997) (quoting Metro. Life, 471
U.S. at 744 n.21). Paredes asserts that "[b]y saving state insurance regulation from preemption,
Congress preserved and reaffirmed the role of the states as the primary regulators in the field of in-
surance, notwithstanding the leading congressional objective of federally uniform benefit plan regu-
lations." Id. See Metro. Life, 471 U.S. 724; JOHN J. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW, 417 (2d ed. 1995) (asserting that the savings clause provision continues
the federal policy entrenched in the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, that is to defer to the states in
the regulation of the insurance industry); Leslie C. Levin, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Indi-
rect Regulation of Employee Welfare Plans through State Insurance Laws, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1536, 1539-40 (1978).
54. See Paredes, supra note 53.
55. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 743. The Court felt that passing the McCarran-Ferguson test
"strongly supports the conclusion that regulation regarding the substantive terms of insurance con-
tracts falls squarely within the savings clause as laws 'which regulate insurance."' Id. at 742-43.
"The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted by Congress in 1945 in response to the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in U.S. v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)." WOODRUFF,
supra note 18, at 20-32. "In that case, the Court held that regulation of interstate insurance activity
was within the Commerce Clause power of Congress." Id. "Congress responded adversely to the
Court's decision, immediately enacting McCarran-Ferguson 'to assure that the activities of insur-
ance companies in dealing with their policyholders would remain subject to state regulation."' Id.
(quoting S.E.C. v. Nat 'I Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453,459 (1969)).
56. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 743. See also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119,
129 (1982); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); WOODRUFF,
supra note 18, at 20-33. While the holding in Metropolitan Life did not explicitly say that all three
of the McCarran-Ferguson factors must be satisfied in order to avoid preemption by way of the sav-
ings clause, later Supreme Court rulings and district court rulings implied that all three McCarran-
Ferguson factors must be satisfied in order to avoid preemption. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1987) (finding that state law did not regulate insurance after concluding that
law satisfied only one of the three McCarran-Ferguson factors); WOODRUFF, supra note 18, at 20-
33 ("If a court finds that the state law in question fails either the commonsense test or any one ...
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three factors, the Court was convinced that, both historically and concep-
tually, mandated benefit statutes regulate insurance within the meaning
of the ERISA savings clause.57
The holding in Metropolitan Life was significant because it stated a
comprehensive method to determine whether a law "regulates insur-
ance," thus providing a precedent for subjecting state laws to analysis
under both the commonsense test and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.58
2. Russell and Pilot Life: Remedies Cannot Conflict with ERISA
In Rush, the Court briefly discussed cases that helped lead to a de-
cision about whether a particular law provides remedies that conflict
with ERISA's civil enforcement provision.59
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell60 was the first Su-
preme Court case to conclude that Congress had not intended causes of
action under ERISA beyond those specified in the civil enforcement
provision.61 Russell involved an employee benefit plan participant (Rus-
sell) who sued her benefit plan administrator (Massachusetts Mutual) for
breach of fiduciary duty.6 2 When Russell became temporarily disabled
on account of a back injury, the Massachusetts Mutual disability com-
criteria... the law fails to fall within the ERISA savings clause and is therefore preempted.");
Texas Pharmacy Ass'n v. Prudential Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 1035 (5th Cir. 1997). Some courts have
held prior to Rush that all three of the McCarran-Ferguson factors must be satisfied for a law to
regulate insurance. See CIGNA Healthplan of La., Inc. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996).
But see Cisneros v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 669 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the McCarran-
Ferguson factors were simply relevant considerations or guideposts and not essential elements of a
three part test that must be satisfied for a law to escape preemption).
57. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 744. The Court noted that there was an absence of case authority
suggesting that laws regulating the terms of insurance contracts could not be understood as laws that
regulate insurance. Id. "In short, the plain language of the saving clause, its relationship to the
other ERISA preemption provisions, and the traditional understanding of insurance regulation, all
lead to the conclusion that mandated-benefit laws ... are saved from preemption by the operation of
the savings clause." Id.
58. See Gregory, supra note 15; Paredes, supra note 53, at n.48. While many earlier cases
asserted many of the same principles stated in Metropolitan Life, it is the latter that is most cited for
the two-tier approach to the savings clause analysis. See id.
59. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 378-79 (2002). Recall that even if a
law is "saved" from preemption by way of the savings clause, it might still be preempted if it pro-
vides a remedy that was specifically rejected in ERISA. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying
text.
60. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
61. Rush, 536 U.S. at 378 (citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 148). See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 29929
(1974); 120 CONG. REC. 29210-29211 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 1, 9 (1973); see also Russell,
473 U.S. at 148 n. 17 (stating that Congress was concerned that the cost of federal standards would
discourage the growth of private pension plans).
62. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-37.
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mittee terminated her benefits based on a report of an orthopedic sur-
geon indicating a lack of orthopedic illness.
63
After Russell's psychiatrist submitted a report to the disability
committee explaining that Russell suffered from physical manifestations
of a psychosomatic disability, the plan administrator reinstated her bene-
fits. 64  Although the plan paid all benefits to which Russell had been
contractually entitled, Russell sued, alleging that the untimely processing
of her claim by plan administrators had caused injury to her during the
132 days she had been temporarily terminated from the plan's benefits. 65
Russell's claim for breach of fiduciary duty was found to be governed by
ERISA, and the Court of Appeals held that ERISA's provision for
breach of fiduciary duty left room for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.66
63. Id. at 136.
64. Id. The disability committee discontinued her benefits based on the orthopedic surgeon's
report that there was nothing physically causing the problems about which Russell complained. See
id. After the psychiatrist's report clarified that the condition was caused by a mental strain and not a
physical injury, the committee reinstated her benefits. See id. The benefits were terminated on Oc-
tober 17, 1979, and reinstated March 11, 1980. Id. Two days later, retroactive benefits were paid in
full. Id. Russell later qualified for permanent disability benefits that were paid regularly. Id. at n. 1.
65. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-37. Among other allegations, Russell asserted that fiduciaries
administering the plan were high ranking company officials who: (1) ignored readily available
medical evidence documenting her disability; (2) applied unwarrantedly strict eligibility standards;
and (3) deliberately took 132 days to process her claim in violation of regulations promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor. Id. Russell claimed the interruption of benefit payments forced her disabled
husband to cash out his retirement savings which, in turn, aggravated the psychological condition
that caused Russell's back ailment. Id.
66. The case was originally brought in California Superior court, but then removed to United
States District Court for the Central District of California where Massachusetts Mutual moved for
summary judgment. Russell, 473 U.S. at 137. The district court granted the motion, holding that
the state-law claims were preempted by ERISA and that "ERISA bars any claims for extra-
contractual damages and punitive damages arising out of the original denial of plaintiff's claims."
Id. (quoting App. To Pet. For Cert. 29a). ERISA establishes liability for breach of fiduciary duty by
stating:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsi-
bilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally li-
able to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach,
and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
Id. at 139 (emphasis added). The court of appeals conclusion focused on the language "such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate" to say that this gives the court a
wide discretion to decide what damages should be awarded. Id. at 138. According to the court of
appeals, the award of compensatory damages should remedy the wrong and make the aggrieved
individual whole. Id. The court of appeals thought that this meant they could compensate for inju-
ries sustained as the direct or proximate cause of the breach of fiduciary duty. Id. The court of ap-
peals also thought that this meant that they could award punitive damages if it decided that the fidu-
ciary acted with actual malice or wanton indifference to the rights of a participant. Id.
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The case was submitted to the United States Supreme Court to re-
view the compensatory and punitive damage components of the court of
appeals' holding. 67 The Supreme Court held that any extra-contractual
damages not explicitly included in ERISA's civil enforcement provision
were deliberately omitted and could not be sustained.68 Neither punitive
nor compensatory damages were included in ERISA's civil enforcement
provision.69
67. Russell, 473 U.S. at 138. The Court found that there was no doubt that a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty was available under ERISA. Id. at 140. Instead, the issue was whether a violation
of this duty allowed damages to be recovered by a plan beneficiary or by the plan as a whole. See
id. The Court found that the recovery pertained to the plan as a whole. See id. It supported this
finding with the "text of [the provision], by the statutory provisions defining the duties of a fiduci-
ary, and by the provisions defining the rights of a beneficiary." Id. The Court goes on to find that
"[tihe only section that concerns review of a claim that has been denied... merely specifies that
every plan shall comply with certain regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor." Id. at
143. The Secretary's regulations state that claim decisions should be made promptly, and that if a
decision is not made within 120 days then the claim will be considered denied. Id. at 144. A claim-
ant may then bring a civil action to have the merits of his application determined. Id. The civil en-
forcement provision thus governs the right of a beneficiary to bring an action to enforce his rights
under the plan, and the civil enforcement provision says "nothing about the recovery of extra-
contractual damages or about the possible consequences of delay in the plan administrators' proc-
essing of a disputed claim." Id. For the full text of the civil enforcement provision, see supra note
38.
68. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 148. The Court listed several factors that are relevant to deter-
mine ifa private remedy is implicit in a statute that does not expressly authorize such remedy:
Is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' that
is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff.?
Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a
remedy or to deny one?
Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff?.
Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, so that it would be inappro-
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 145 n.13 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)) (internal citations omitted). The Court
conceded that two of the factors were met, but it found that legislative intent and consistency with
the legislative scheme were not met. Id. at 145. The Court went on to say, "unless this congres-
sional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other
source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist." Russell,
473 U.S. at 145 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981)).
The Court stated:
The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in [the civil enforcement
provision] of the statute [ERISA] as finally enacted, however, provide strong evidence
that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorpo-
rate expressly. The assumption of inadvertent omission is rendered especially suspect
upon close consideration of ERISA's interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent re-
medial scheme, which is in turn part of a "comprehensive and reticulated statute."
Id. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980))
(emphasis in original).
69. See Russell. 473 U.S. at 144.
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Two years after Russell, the Court decided Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux.70  In Pilot Life, an employee brought common law breach of
contract and tort claims against the insurance company that issued his
employer's group insurance policy. 71  Dedeaux sought "damages for
failure to provide benefits under the insurance policy ... general dam-
ages for mental and emotional distress [and] other incidental damages
and punitive damages. 72 Dedeaux did not assert any of the causes of
action available to him under ERISA.73 The district court dismissed the
action, holding that ERISA's preemption clause voided the state law
claims.74 The court of appeals reversed, finding that "ERISA's savings
clause rescued [the] claims from ERISA preemption because the claims
arose from state laws that regulate insurance. 75
The Supreme Court agreed that ERISA does preempt common law
claims arising from employment related insurance policies, but it held
that these laws are not laws that "regulate insurance" within the meaning
of the saving clause.76 The Court used the two-tier approach identified
in Metro. Life, but provided that under the commonsense inquiry a law
70. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). In the same term that the Supreme
Court decided Pilot Life, it also decided Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
In Taylor the Court "upheld removal jurisdiction of a suit challenging the denial of disability bene-
fits by an insurer-including damages and remedies unavailable under ERISA-based on Con-
gress's clearly expressed intent that benefits claims under ERISA be found to arise under federal
law." Phyllis C. Borzi, Distinguishing Between Coverage and Treatment Decisions under ERISA
Health Plans: What's Left of ERISA Preemption?, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1219, 1232 (2001). Although
the Court in Rush mentions Taylor as a stepping stone to Pilot Life, it is not a principal case in the
Court's analysis and will not be discussed in detail in this Note. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., v.
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 378 (2002). For a more detailed analysis of Taylor, see id.; Joyce Krutick
Craig, Managed Care Grievance Procedures. The Dilemma and the Cure, 21 J. NAT'L ASSOC.
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 336, 343-45 (2001); Ann H. Nevers, ERISA Right to Sue: An RXfor Health
Care That Places Forum Over Substantive Consumer Rights, 31 N.M. L. REV. 493, 501-02 (2001).
71. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43. The complaint specifically contained three counts: "Tortious
Breach of Contract;" "Breach of Fiduciary Duties;" and "Fraud in the Inducement." Id. Dedeaux
injured his back in an employment related accident. Id. His employer had a long term disability
benefit plan that was established by purchasing a group insurance policy from Pilot Life Ins. Co. Id.
Pilot Life terminated Dedeaux's disability benefits after two years. Id. During the following three
years, the benefits were reinstated and terminated by Pilot Life several times. Id.
72. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43. The total amount of incidental and punitive damages sought
was $750,000. Id. at 44.
73. Id.
74. Id. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme
Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 992 (2000).
75. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 44. The court of appeals relied on the then recent holding in Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). Id. In Metropolitan Life, the Court
used a two-tier approach to decide that mandated benefit statutes regulate insurance within the
meaning of the ERISA savings clause. See supra notes 46-48.
76. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57; See Bogan, supra note 74, at 992-93.
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must be specifically directed toward the insurance industry to pass the
test.77 The Court went on to support this notion by finding that the
McCarran-Ferguson factors were not met. 78 This was enough to con-
clude that the claim was preempted by ERISA. In Rush, the Court de-
scribed the holding in Pilot Life as "ERISA... not tolerat[ing] a diver-
sity action seeking monetary damages for breach generally and for
consequential and emotional distress, neither of which Congress had au-
thorized in ERISA's civil enforcement provision.,
79
77. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50. The Court stated:
Certainly a common-sense understanding of the phrase "regulates insurance" does not
support the argument that the Mississippi law of bad faith falls under the saving clause.
A common-sense view of the word 'regulates' would lead to the conclusion that in order
to regulate insurance, a law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but
must be specifically directed toward that industry. Even though the Mississippi Supreme
Court has identified its law of bad faith with the insurance industry, the roots of this law
are firmly planted in the general principles of Mississippi tort and contract law.
Id.
78. Id. at 5 1. The McCarran-Ferguson Act contains three criteria relevant to determining
whether a particular practice refers to the "business of insurance." These three factors are: (1) the
practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) the practice involves an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
The Court distinguished Pilot Life from the mandated benefit laws at issue in Metropolitan Life by
finding that common law bad faith actions do not effect the spreading of a policyholder's risk. Pilot
Life, 481 U.S. at 50. Furthermore, the Court held that the connection between the law and the in-
sured-insurer relationship was "attenuated at best." Id. at 50-5 1. The Court also stated:
In contrast to the mandated-benefits law in Metropolitan Life, the common law of bad
faith does not define the terms of the relationship between the insurer and the insured; it
declares only that, whatever terms have been agreed upon in the insurance contract, a
breach of that contract may in certain circumstances allow the policyholder to obtain pu-
nitive damages. The state common law of bad faith is therefore no more 'integral' to the
insurer-insured relationship than any State's general contract law is integral to a contract
made in that State.
Id. at 51.
79. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 378 (2002). The Court stated that in
interpreting the saving clause they must consider not only the commonsense test and the McCarran-
Ferguson factors but also "the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a whole." Pilot Life, 481 U.S.
at 51. "In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sen-
tence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Id. (quoting Kelly
v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1989)). The Court, therefore, felt it necessary to look to legislative
intent concerning the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA. Id. at 52. The Court went on to cite
Russell, stating that the civil enforcement provision of ERISA provided no express authority for an
award of punitive damages to a beneficiary. Id. at 53. Indeed,
[W]e decline[] to find an implied cause of action for punitive damages in that section,
noting that "the presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is
strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an
integrated system of procedures for enforcement." Our examination of these provisions
made us "reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care
as the one in ERISA."
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Debra Moran was a beneficiary under a Rush Prudential HMO plan
in Illinois. 80 In 1996, Debra began experiencing numbness in her right
shoulder. She consulted her primary care physician, Dr. LaMarre,81 who
administered traditional and non-invasive treatments. 82 When those
treatments failed to provide relief, Dr. LaMarre, pursuant to the HMO
contract, advised Rush Prudential that Moran would be "best served" by
a non-traditional treatment performed by a specialist who was not part of
the plan of doctors.83  Rush Prudential denied the request, and after
Moran's internal appeals, Rush Prudential affirmed the denial on the
ground that the procedure was not "medically necessary. 84
Id. at 54 (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985)). See also
Borzi, supra note 70, at 1231 (giving an overview of some cases that have relied on Pilot Life). But
see Bogan, supra note 74, at 995 (opining that the Court's opinion in Pilot Life was flawed from the
outset).
80. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002). The Illinois HMO Act de-
fines a "Health Maintenance Organization" as "any organization formed under the laws of this or
another state to provide or arrange for one or more health care plans under a system which causes
any part of the risk of health care delivery to be borne by the organization or its providers." 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/1-2 et seq. (2000). For journals describing the facts of the Rush case see
Katherine A. Hesse & Doris MacKenzie Ehrens, Independent Physician Review of Medical Neces-
sity, BENEFITS Q., Oct. 1, 2002, at 70, available at 2002 WL 15992383; Carolyn J. Speck, Abstracts
of Significant Cases Bearing on the Regulation of lnsurance, J. INS. REG., Oct. 1, 2002, at 89, avail-
able at 2002 WL 24376181. See also Joan Biskupic, Justices Weigh HMO Review; Ill. Case Ques-
tions the Rights of States to Resolve Disputes, USA TODAY, Jan. 17, 2002.
81. Debra received her HMO coverage through her husband's employer. Rush, 536 U.S. at
359. The HMO promised that Rush would provide them with "medically necessary" services. Id.
Under the plan, a patient must choose a primary care physician from a list of physicians affiliated
with Rush. Id. at 360. That physician is the one who decides whether treatment should be recom-
mended to Rush as "medically necessary." Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Under the HMO contract, Rush would pay for medical services by an unaffiliated
physician only if the services had been "authorized" both by the primary care physician and Rush's
medical director. Id.
84. Id. Under the plan, Rush is given broad discretion in deciding if something is "medically
necessary."
[A] service is covered as "medically necessary" if Rush finds: (a) [The service] is fur-
nished or authorized by a Participating Doctor for the diagnosis or the treatment of a
Sickness or Injury or for the maintenance of a person's good health. (b) The prevailing
opinion within the appropriate specialty of the United States medical profession is that
[the service] is safe and effective for its intended use, and that its omission would ad-
versely affect the person's medical condition. (c) It is furnished by a provider with ap-
propriate training, experience, staff and facilities to furnish that particular service or sup-
ply.
Id. Two surgeons affiliated with Rush Prudential HMO recommended a less drastic, less expensive
surgery. Biskupic, supra note 80. While the suit was pending, Moran had surgery by the recom-
mended specialist at her own expense and submitted the $94,841.27 reimbursement claim to Rush.
Rush, 536 U.S. at 362. Rush treated it as a renewed request for benefits and, after a new inquiry,
20041
19
Reinhart: Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran: 21 or Bust! Does ERISA Preemp
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Moran then made a written demand for an independent medical re-
view of her claim as was guaranteed by § 4-10 of Illinois's HMO Act.85
When Rush failed to comply with the request, Moran filed suit in Illinois
state court to force Rush to comply with the Act.86 Rush removed the
case to federal court arguing complete preemption under ERISA.87
The federal court remanded the case back to state court on Moran's
motion, stating that the complaint requested independent review and
therefore, there was no need for ERISA interpretation.8 On remand, the
state court enforced the statute and Rush was ordered to submit to re-
view by an independent physician. 89 Dr. A. Lee Dellon, a reconstructive
surgeon at Johns Hopkins Medical Center was the independent physician
obtained to perform the review.90 He concluded the non-conventional
again denied the request as "medically unnecessary." Id. Moran was quoted explaining her deci-
sion, "I had terrible headaches. I couldn't use my arm. I couldn't live much longer like that."
Biskupic, supra. Moran paid for this procedure by borrowing from her mother-in-law and maxing
out credit cards. Id.
85. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Fourty-one states and the District of Columbia
currently have independent review statutes similar to the one in Illinois. Wendy Mariner, Who Gov-
erns HMOs?, 170 N.J.L.J. 679 (2002); Biskupic supra note 80. See also William L. Reider, Ruling
Helps HMO Patients, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 2002, at 23A available at 2002 WL
101348459 (discussing how some of these independent review statutes do not have the teeth that the
Illinois statute has because they are either not offered to all the health care districts in a state or be-
cause they include little or no sanctions for failure to comport with them).
86. Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959, 964 (7th Cir. 2000) affd, 536 U.S.
355 (2002).
87. Id.
88. Id. The Court noted that "preemption is generally a defense and that, under the well-
pleaded complaint rule, an anticipated federal defense could not be the basis for removal." Id.
"Nonetheless, the district court also noted a 'completely preempted' state law claim could be re-
moved, but the court explained, in the ERISA context, only state law claims that conflicted with
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions were completely preempted by ERISA." Id. The district
court concluded that Ms. Moran's request for specific performance was not a claim under ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions and, therefore, was not completely preempted. Id. The district court
left open the possibility that a "claim for reimbursement under § 4-10 of the HMO Act, in contrast
to a request to have the independent review performed, might be a claim for benefits that would be
completely preempted by ERISA's civil enforcement provisions." Id. However, the Supreme Court
pointed out that this ruling may not have been appropriate because a suit to compel compliance with
§ 4-10 seemed the same as bringing suit to compel under 29 U.S.C. § I 132(a)(3). Rush, 536 U.S. at
363 n.2. The Court suggested that "alternatively, the proper course may have been to bring a suit to
recover benefits due [since by this time Moran had already had the surgery and therefore, would
ultimately be seeking compensation for the $94,841 cost to her] alleging that the denial was im-
proper in the absence of compliance with § 4-10." Id.
89. Moran, 230 F.3d at 964. The state court reserved the ruling on whether ERISA pre-
empted the portion of § 4-10 requiring the HMO to cover the procedure in the event that the inde-
pendent physician determines the procedure is medically necessary. Id. at 964-65.
90. Id. at 965. Dr. Dellon has been in practice since 1978. A. Lee Dellon M.D., Plastic and
Reconstructive Surgery, available at http://www.plasticsurgery.org/md/dellon.htm. His education
includes Johns Hopkins University, 1962-1966; Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, 1966-1970;
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procedure had been "medically necessary" within the meaning of the
plan.9' Rush's medical director refused to agree the procedure was
medically necessary and again denied the claim. 92 Moran amended her
complaint in state court to seek reimbursement based on the Illinois
HMO Act § 4-10, which requires an HMO to pay upon the independent
reviewer's finding that the service was medically necessary.9 3
Rush again sought removal to federal court stating that the com-
plaint was completely preempted by ERISA.94 The federal district court
agreed and granted summary judgment to Rush on the ground that
ERISA preempted Illinois' independent review statute. 95 The Court of
Columbia-Presbyterian Hospital, 1970-1972; Raymond M. Curtis Hand Center, Hand Fellowship,
1977; National Cancer Institute, N.I.H, 1972-1974; John Hopkins Hospital: General and Plastic
Surgery, 1974-1978. Id. He is board certified in plastic surgery and has added qualification in hand
surgery. Id. Dr. Dellon's practice philosophy statement reads:
Much of my practice deals with NERVE problems for which I have developed opera-
tions that are successful both in the HANDS AND FEET. I offer unique solutions for
PAINFUL NEUROMAS, DIABETIC NEUROPATHY, NERVE COMPRESSION (in-
cluding carpal, cubital, and tarsal tunnel syndrome, Morton's neuroma, calcaneal nerve
entrapment), and REFLEX SYMPATHETIC DYSTROPHY (RSD). Documentation of
nerve problems is done with QUANTITATIVE SENSORY TESTING using NK de-
vices. I also offer reanimation of the face for FACIAL PARALYSIS. I have also devel-
oped operations to relieve KNEE PAIN and SHOULDER PAIN after failed orthopedic
o Id. procedures such as knee replacement and rotator cuff repair.
91. Moran, 230 F.3d at 964. Dr. Dellon decided that Dr. Terzis's [non-conventional] treat-
ment had been medically necessary based on the definition of medical necessity in Rush's Certifi-
cate of Group Coverage as well as his own medical judgment. Rush, 536 U.S. at 362.
92. Moran, 230 F.3d. at 965. Under the plan, Rush would only pay for medical services by an
unaffiliated physician if the services had been "authorized" by both the primary care physician and
Rush's medical director. Rush, 536 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added).
93. Moran, 230 F.3d at 965. The Illinois statute states in relevant part, "In the event that the
reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary, the Health Mainte-
nance Organization shall provide the covered service." § 4-10; see supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
94. Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 363 (2002). Rush argued complete
preemption under ERISA's civil enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), as construed by the
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (holding that employee's
common law contract and tort claims were preempted by ERISA and fell within the provision estab-
lishing exclusive federal cause of action for resolution of suits by beneficiaries to recover benefits
from covered plan). Id.
95. Moran, 230 F.3d at 965. The court relied on Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88
F.3d 1482, 1487 (7th Cir. 1996). Id. Jass involved a plaintiff who brought a negligence action un-
der Illinois law against an ERISA plan. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1485. The Jass court explained how they
had previously analyzed complete preemption and conflict preemption. Id. The court held that a
claim brought under ERISA § 502(a) provides the basis for complete preemption whereas § 514(a)
provides the basis for conflict preemption. Id. ERISA § 502(a) is now 29 U.S.C. 1132(a), the civil
enforcement provision and ERISA § 514(a) is now 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), the preemption provision.
See supra notes 38 and 24, respectively, and accompanying text. The court went on to give the
three factors relevant to determining whether a claim is within the scope of § 502(a):
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court decision, find-
ing that the Illinois HMO Act was a state law that "regulates insurance"
under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(2)(A), and is thus exempted from pre-
emption.96 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding
directly conflicted with the Fifth Circuit's holding on a similar provi-
sion.
97
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's
ruling and upheld the Illinois statute.98 The Court acknowledged that §
4-10 "relates to" employee benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA's
preemption provision since it "bears indirectly but substantially on all
insured employee benefit plans."99  However, the Court nonetheless
found that the statute is a law regulating insurance and, as such, is saved
from ERISA preemption. °° The Court's analysis contained four main
findings: first, that the Illinois statute "regulated insurance" within the
(1) whether the "plaintiff [is] eligible to bring a claim under that section;" (2) whether
the plaintiffs "cause of action falls within the scope of an ERISA provision that the
plaintiff can enforce via § 502(a);" and (3) whether the plaintiffs "state law claim can-
not be resolved without an interpretation of the contract governed by federal law."
Id. (quoting Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1995)).
96. Rush, 536 U.S. at 363-64. The court of appeals agreed that Moran's claim was com-
pletely preempted by ERISA so as to place it properly in federal court. Id. at 363. However, the
saving clause allowed the finding that the law was valid regardless. Moran, 230 F.3d at 971 (reject-
ing the argument that the Illinois Act constituted an "alternative remedy" and emphasizing that the
Illinois Act does not authorize a particular form of relief in state courts; rather, with respect to any
ERISA health plan, the judgment of the independent reviewer is only enforceable in an action
brought under ERISA's civil enforcement scheme, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)). See id.
97. Rush, 536 U.S. at 364. The Supreme Court needed to resolve a split between the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits involving the ERISA preemption of binding state external review programs. Mat-
thew J. Binette, Comment, Patients' Bill of Rights: Legislative Cure-All or Prescription for Disas-
ter?, 81 N.C. L. REV. 653, 672 (2003). The Fifth Circuit in Corp. Health Ins. v. Tex. Dept. ofIns.,
215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000), ruled that a state cannot require a health plan to submit to a biding
external review of its coverage decision without conflicting with ERISA. Id. "The circuit court
reasoned that because such external review laws 'relate to' employee benefit plans, they were pre-
empted by ERISA." Id. Conversely, the Seventh Circuit held that the saving clause contained in
ERISA exempts state insurance laws from ERISA preemption. Id. at 672-73.
98. Rush, 536 U.S. at 387. Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated, "[t]o the extent that
benefits litigation in some federal courts may have to account for the effects of § 4-10, it would be
an exaggeration to hold that the objectives of § 1132(a) are undermined. The saving clause is enti-
tled to prevail here." Id.
99. Id. at 365 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739
(1985)). The Court held that there was no real dispute as to whether the Illinois Act "relate[d] to"
employee benefit plans within the meaning of § 1144(a). Id. Therefore, under that section, ERISA
would preempt only if 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(2)(A) did not apply to "save" it from preemption. See
id.
100. Mark C. Nielsen, Piercing the Preemption Veil: Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran Opens
the Door for Additional State Regulation of Managed Care Organizations, 14 No. 5 HEALTH LAW.
15 (2002).
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meaning of ERISA's saving clause; second, that the statute did not con-
flict with ERISA by supplanting or supplementing its civil enforcement
scheme; third, that the statute did not impose an arbitral adjudication
scheme at odds with ERISA civil enforcement scheme; and fourth, that
the statute did not conflict with ERISA by impermissibly depriving
HMOs of deferential standard of review of benefits determinations. 0 1
In making the determination that the Illinois Act "regulates insur-
ance" within the meaning of ERISA's saving clause, the Court began
with the "commonsense view of the matter" used in Metropolitan Life
and Pilot Life.102 According to the Court, the commonsense inquiry "fo-
cuses on 'primary elements of an insurance contract [, which] are the
spreading and underwriting of the policyholder's risk."" '0 3  The Court
found that the Illinois Act addresses these elements by defining "health
maintenance organization" by reference to the risk that it bears.' 04
Rush argued that the Illinois Act was not "specifically directed to-
ward the insurance industry," as Pilot Life had held it needed to be, be-
cause HMOs act as both providers and insurers.'0 5 The Court answered
101. See id.; Rush, 536 U.S. at 363-87.
102. Rush, 536 U.S. at 365-66. In Metropolitan Life, the Court formally introduced the "com-
monsense view of the matter." See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740
(1985). However, it was Pilot Life that specified that when using the commonsense view of the
matter, "a law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically di-
rected toward that industry." Rush, 536 U.S. at 366 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 50 (1987)). Each case is described in detail supra notes 47-57.
103. Rush, 536 U.S. at 366 (quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S.
205, 211 (1979)).
104. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 125, § 1-2(9) (2000). The statute reads in relevant part, "[a]n
HMO provides or arranges for.., health care plans under a system which causes any part of the risk
of health care delivery to be borne by the organization or its providers." Id.; Rush, 536 U.S. at 366.
See supra Section 1. The Court found that, "[t]he defining feature of an HMO is receipt of a fixed
fee for each patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to provide specified health care if
needed." Rush, 536 U.S. at 367 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000)). As an
HMO assumes the financial risk of providing the benefits promised, and underwrites and spreads
the risk among participants, Rush holds that HMOs are engaged in the "business of insurance." Id.
The Court furthers explains:
"[l]f a participant never gets sick, the HMO keeps the money regardless, and if a partici-
pant becomes expensively ill, the HMO is responsible for the treatment... The HMO
design goes beyond the simple truism that all contracts are, in some sense, insurance
against future fluctuations in price ... because HMOs actually underwrite and spread
risk among their participants ... a feature distinctive to insurance.
Id. (quoting Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218-19). See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
104 (4th ed. 1992); see, e.g., S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 73 (1959) (stat-
ing that the underwriting of risk is an "earmark of insurance as it has commonly been conceived of
in popular understanding and usage"); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S.
205, 214 n. 12 (1979) (stating "unless there is some element of spreading risk more widely, there is
no underwriting of risk").
105. Rush, 536 U.S. at 366. Rush contended that "seeing an HMO as an insurer distorts the
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by saying "as long as providing insurance fairly accounts for the applica-
tion of state law, the saving clause may apply."' 0 6 Moreover, the Court
noted that Congress, in enacting the HMO Act of 1973, understood that
HMOs would be acting as insurers by defining HMOs in part by refer-
ence to the risk and setting minimum standards for managing that risk.
10 7
nature of an HMO, which is... a healthcare provider too" and that the status as a healthcare pro-
vider "should determine its characterization, with the consequence that regulation of an HMO is not
insurance regulation within the meaning of ERISA." Id. Furthermore, Rush argued that the Illinois
Act "sweeps too broadly with definitions capturing organizations that provide no insurance, and by
regulating non-insurance activities of HMOs that do." Id. at 370. "Rush points out that Illinois law
defines HMOs to include organizations that cause the risk of health care delivery to be borne by the
organization itself, or by 'its providers."' Id. (quoting 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/1-2(9) (2000)). In
Rush's view, the reference to "its providers" suggests that an organization may be an HMO under
state law even if it does not bear risk itself, either because it has contracted the risk to others or be-
cause it has contracted only to provide "administrative" and other services for self funded plans. Id.
at 370-71 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, at 38). The Court answers this argument by calling it an
"unsound assumption[]," that assumes an HMO is no longer an insurer when it arranges to limit its
exposure. Rush, 536 U.S. at 371. The Court noted:
The problem with Rush's argument is simply that a reinsurance contract does not take
the primary insurer out of the insurance business.., and capitation contracts do not re-
lieve the HMO of its obligations to the beneficiary. The HMO is still bound to provide
medical care to its members, and this is so regardless of the ability of physicians or third-
party insurers to honor their contracts with the HMO.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court went on to hold that even if § 4-10 is overly broad, as
Rush contended, by capturing HMOs that provide only administrative services to self funded plans,
"the bare possibility (not the likelihood) of some over-breadth.., is no reason to think Congress
would have meant such minimal application to noninsurers to remove a state law entirely from the
category of insurance regulation saved from preemption." Id. at 372. See Nielsen, supra note 100.
106. Rush, 536 U.S. at 367. The Court found Rush's argument to be one without substance
stating:
The answer to Rush['s contention that it is an insurer and a healthcare provider] is, of
course, that an HMO is both: it provides health care, and it does so as an insurer. Noth-
ing in the saving clause requires an either-or choice between health care and insurance in
deciding a preemption question, and as long as providing insurance fairly accounts for
the application of state law, the saving clause may apply.
Id. The Court went on to say that there was "no serious question about [the fact that providing in-
surance fairly accounts for the application of state law] here, for it would ignore the whole purpose
of the HMO style of organization to conceive of HMOs (even in the traditional sense) without their
insurance element." Id.
107. Id. at 367-69. The HMO Act of 1973 was "intended to encourage the development of
HMOs as a new form of health care delivery system.., and when Congress set the standards that
the new health delivery organizations would have to meet to get certain federal benefits, the terms
included requirements that the organizations bear and manage the risk." Rush, 536 U.S. at 367-68;
see Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, § 1301(c), 87 Stat. 916 (1973) (as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 300e(c) (1994)). The very text of the HMO Act of 1973 assumed that state insurance laws
would apply to HMOs. Rush, 536 U.S. at 368. The Court stated, "[i]n other words, one year before
it passed ERISA, Congress itself defined HMOs in part by reference to risk, set minimum standards
for managing the risk, showed awareness that States regulated HMOs as insurers, and compared
HMOs to 'indemnity or service benefits insurance plans."' Id. at 369 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-129,
at 30 (1973)). The Court went on to say that the conception of HMOs has not changed since the
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The Court then analyzed this result under the three criteria of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act used in Metropolitan Life.' 0 8 The Court found
that the second and third prongs were present which was requisite to a
finding that the Illinois Act "regulates insurance" within the meaning of
the saving clause and is, therefore, "saved" from preemption. 0 9 Specifi-
cally, the Court found it "obvious" that the independent review require-
ment regulates "an integral part of the policy relationship" by adding an
extra layer of review when there is internal disagreement about an
HMO's denial of coverage.' 10 Moreover, once it is established that
HMO contracts are, in fact, contracts for insurance (which was decided
under the commonsense test), it is clear that § 4-10 does not apply to en-
tities outside of the insurance industry and thus meets the third prong of
the McCarran-Ferguson factors.1
HMO Act adoption.
Since passage of the federal Act, States have been adopting their own HMO enabling
Acts, and today, at least 40 of them, including Illinois, regulate HMOs primarily through
the States' insurance departments... although they may be treated differently from tra-
ditional insurers, owing to their additional role as health care providers. Finally, this
view shared by Congress and the States has passed into common understanding. HMOs
(broadly defined) have "grown explosively in the past decade and [are] now the domi-
nant form of health plan coverage for privately insured individuals."
Id. (quoting Marsha R. Gold & Robert Hurley, The Role of Managed Care "Products" in Managed
Care "Plans, "in CONTEMPORARY MANAGED CARE 47 (Marsha R. Gold, ed., 1998) (noting that the
dominant feature of HMOs is the combination of insurer and provider)); Jonathan P. Weiner &
Gragory de Lissovoy, Rating a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insur-
ance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 75, 83 (1993) (noting that the original form of the HMO
was a single corporation employing its own physicians, but that the 1980's saw a variety of other
types of structures develop even as traditional insurers altered their own plans by adopting HMO-
like cost control measures).
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (providing three criteria to find that a law regulates insurance).
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
109. Rush, 536 U.S. at 373. The Court noted that under UNUMIns. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358
(1999), the McCarran-Ferguson Factors were "guideposts" and a state law is not required to satisfy
all three to be considered a law that "regulates insurance." Id. The Court specifically left open
whether Illinois' external review statute satisfied the first McCarran-Ferguson factor by spreading
the policyholder's risk. Id.; Nielsen, supra note 100, at 17.
110. Rush, 536 U.S. at 373. The Court noted that "[t]he reviewer applies both a standard of
medical care (medical necessity) and characteristically, as in this case, construes policy terms." Id.
"The review affects the 'policy relationship' between HMO and covered persons by translating the
relationship under the HMO agreement into concrete terms of specific obligation or freedom from
duty." Id. The Court distinguished the independent review statute in Rush from the "peer review"
at issue in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982), saying that the insurer's resort
to peer review in Pireno was simply "the insurer's unilateral choice to seek advice if and when it
cared to do so." Rush, 536 U.S. at 374. The Court noted that "[t]he insurer's contract for advice
from a third party was of no concern of the insured, who was not bound by the peer review commit-
tee's recommendation any more, for that matter, than the insurer was." Id. In contrast, Illinois'
independent review statute provides a legal right to the insured, enforceable against the HMO. Id.
11. Nielsen, supra note 100, at 17 (finding an Act does not apply to entities outside of the
2004]
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Based on the Court's findings regarding the commonsense analysis
and the McCarran-Ferguson test, it was concluded that § 4-10 of the Illi-
nois HMO Act "regulates insurance," and ERISA's saving clause "os-
tensibly forecloses preemption.'' 12
Rush, however, argued in the alternative that even if a state law
regulates insurance it may still be preempted if it allows for the kind of
"alternative remedy" that Pilot Life held would not be allowed." 3 Rush
argued that requiring an HMO to follow an external reviewer's judgment
as to what constitutes a medically necessary service or treatment (as § 4-
10 does) effectively operates as a form of binding arbitration that allows
the decision maker to examine the claim de novo, supplanting judicial
review available under ERISA."1 4  While Rush's main contention was
that the law allows remedies not available in ERISA's civil enforcement
plan, the Court takes each part of the argument and rejects them one-by-
one. 115
First, the Court agrees that in ERISA law they have recognized the
civil enforcement provision as being enacted to carry out Congress' clear
intent that it provides the only remedies available under ERISA.'
16
insurance industry does not mean that it applies to all entities within it either). See Rush, 536 U.S.
at 374 (stating that the final factor of the McCarran-Ferguson test is satisfied for many of the same
reasons that the law passes the commonsense test).
112. Rush, 536 U.S. at 375. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
746 (1985) (stating "if a state law 'regulates insurance' ... it is not pre-empted").
113. Pilot Life involved a statute that was found not to regulate insurance; however, the Court
in Pilot Life went on to say in dictum that even if the statute had been found to regulate insurance it
would still be preempted because it allowed for alternative remedies that were not found in ERISA.
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). This is because Congress intended a "federal
common law of rights and obligations" to develop under ERISA without embellishment by the
states. Id. The Rush Court found that Rush and its amici interpreted Pilot Life wrongly by thinking
it held that any law that presents a conflict with federal goals is simply not a law that "regulates in-
surance" regardless of how the insurance tests come out. Rush, 536 U.S. at 377 n.8.
114. Rush, 536 U.S. at 377-78.
115. Id.at374-381.
116. Id. at 375-76. The Court describes Rush's argument as being a question of congressional
intent, "which is sometimes so clear that it overrides a statutory provision designed to save state law
from being preempted." Id. See Am. Tel. & Telegraph Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214,
227 (1998) (concerning a clause in the communications Act of 1934 purporting to save "the reme-
dies now existing at common law or by statute" that was defeated by overriding policy of the filed
rate doctrine); Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913) (saving clause will not
sanction state laws that would nullify policy expressed in federal statute; "the act cannot be said to
destroy itself"). The Court notes that in ERISA law they have "recognized one example of this sort
of overpowering federal policy in the civil enforcement provisions ... authorizing civil actions for
six specific types of relief." Rush, 536 U.S. at 375-76. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. v. Rus-
sell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985), the Court said those provisions amounted to an "interlocking, interrelated,
and interdependent remedial scheme." Id. at 146. Just under two years later, Pilot Life described
that scheme as "represent[ing] a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement
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However, the Court believed that Rush had overstated the rule expressed
in Pilot Life. 117 The Court substantially narrowed the potential scope of
Pilot Life by suggesting that only laws that provide a form of "ultimate
relief in a judicial forum that added to the judicial remedies provided by
ERISA" would qualify as an "alternative remedy" described in Pilot
Life. 8  The Court found that § 4-10 does not enlarge the claim beyond
the benefits available in any action brought under ERISA's civil en-
forcement provision because ultimate relief would still be limited to
those remedies that ERISA authorizes in a suit for benefits." 9 The inde-
pendent reviewer's conclusion may make it easier for a beneficiary to
succeed in an action brought under ERISA, but it will not change the
scope of available remedies. 1
20
The Court next addressed Rush's contention that the state law un-
reasonably interfered with Congress' intention to provide a uniform fed-
eral regime of "rights and obligations.' 121 The Court responded by say-
procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans."
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
117. Rush, 536 U.S. at 378.
118. See Nielsen, supra note 99, at 17-18. "Any such provision patently violates ERISA's pol-
icy of inducing employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of liabilities, under uniform
standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of ultimate remedial orders and awards when a
violation has occurred." Rush, 536 U.S. at 379. The Court noted that up until this case, the inquiry
as to whether state laws allow beneficiaries to obtain remedies outside of those provided in ERISA
had been more straightforward. Id. at 378. Pilot Life involved a suit for money damages for breach
and for consequential damages for emotional distress, both of which are clearly not included in
ERISA's civil enforcement provision. See id. Since Pilot Life, the Court has only found one other
state law to "conflict" with ERISA's civil enforcement provision in providing a prohibited alterna-
tive remedy. Id. at 379. That case involved a claim brought under Texas's tort of wrongful dis-
charge alleging that the employer's motivation for discharging the plaintiff was to avoid paying
pension benefits. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). The Court said that they
had "no trouble" finding the claim to be conflicting with ERISA enforcement because the state law
converted the remedy from an equitable one under ERISA enforcement (available only in federal
district courts) into a legal one for money damages (available in state courts). Rush, 536 U.S. at
379.
119. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 379-80. The Court acknowledges that independent review under §
4-10 may well "settle the fate of a benefit claim under a particular contract," but says that in the end,
if the HMO still refuses to pay, the beneficiary will be forced to puzsue ERISA enforcement. Id.
The judge enforcing the ERISA claim may look to the independent reviewer's opinion to decide
whether a breach has occurred, but this does not change the fact that the claim will still be brought
as an equitable claim under ERISA. See id.; UNUM Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (hold-
ing that a state law barring enforcement of a policy's time limitation on submitting claims did not
conflict with ERISA's civil enforcement provision even though the state "rule of decision" may
mean the difference between a success and failure for a beneficiary).
120. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 379-80. The Court likens the Illinois independent review statute to
the claims-procedure rule that was sustained in UNUMIns. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999). Id.
at 380.
121. Rush, 536 U.S. at381.
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ing that "'such disuniformities ... are the inevitable result of the con-
gressional decision to 'save' local insurance regulation."" 22 The Court
conceded that a state might provide for a type of "review" that would so
resemble an adjudication as to fall within Pilot Life's definition of "al-
ternative remedies" that unreasonably interfere with Congress' inten-
tions; however, the Court did not find that § 4-10 is such a review. 23
The Court acknowledged that § 4-10 is similar to common arbitration
(which would provide an ultimate form of relief conflicting with
ERISA), but distinguished § 4-10 by reasoning that the Illinois law did
not "give the independent reviewer a free-ranging power to construe
contract terms, but instead, confined review to a single term: the phrase
'medical necessity.' ' 124
Finally, the Court rejected Rush's contention that § 4-10 clashed
with the civil enforcement provision by substituting a de novo standard
of review for the deferential standard of review enjoyed by benefit plans
in the past.125 The Court answered this contention in no uncertain terms
122. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985)). In a
footnote the Court explained further:
[W]e do not believe that the mere fact that state independent review laws are likely to
entail different procedures will impose burdens on plan administration that would
threaten the object of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) [the civil enforcement provision]; it is the
HMO contracting with a plan, and not the plan itself, that will... have to establish pro-
cedures for conforming with the local laws .... This means that there will be no special
burden of compliance upon an ERISA plan beyond what the HMO has already provided
for.
Id. at n.l 1.
123. Rush, 536 U.S. at 381-82.
124. Id. at 382-83. "[Alrbitration... render[s] a final and binding decision on the merits of the
controversy and on the basis of proofs presented by the parties." I. MACNEIL, R. SPEIDEL, & T.
STIPANOWICH, 1 FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 2.1.1 (1995) (internal quotations omitted). Arbitra-
tors are generally able to hold hearings at which parties may submit evidence and conduct cross-
examinations and arbitrators are generally vested with the power to subpoena witnesses and admin-
ister oaths. Rush, 536 U.S. at 382. The Court distinguishes § 4-10's independent review because
the reviewer does not have the same free ranging power to construe contract terms. Id. at 383. The
Court likens this limitation to benefit determinations described in Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211
(2000). Rush, 536 U.S. at 383. In Pegram, the Court explained that "when an HMO guarantees
medically necessary care, determinations of coverage 'cannot be untangled from physicians' judg-
ments about reasonable medical treatment."' Id. (quoting Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229). This is how
the independent review statute works -- the reviewer simply receives the medical records and comes
to a "judgment of his own." Id. The Court notes that the Act itself says nothing about requiring the
reviewer to refer to the definition of medical necessity contained in the contract, but the Court as-
sumes that there is always some degree of contract interpretation necessary. Id. at n.12.
125. Rush, 536 U.S. at 384-85. Rush argued that Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101 (1989), recognized that an ERISA plan could be designed to grant "discretion" to a plan
fiduciary who deserves deference from a court reviewing a discretionary judgment and that § 4-10
allows the reviewer to essentially review the judgment de novo. Rush, 536 U.S. at 384. Further,
that de novo review will "carry great weight in a subsequent suit for benefits" under ERISA thus, it
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saying, "ERISA provides nothing about the standard." 126 "It simply re-
quires plans to afford... some mechanism for internal review of a bene-
fit denial .... Therefore, even if the Illinois statute does provide a
de novo standard of review, it does not conflict with ERISA because
ERISA does not specify what standard should be used.
128
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Why Rush is the Right Decision
The majority decision in Rush balances congressional intent 29
while protecting patients' rights and recognizing HMOs' need to procure
profit.
1. "Discretionary Authority" 130 Needs Limits
Allowing HMOs to operate under contracts that reserve "discre-
tionary authority" '131 without limits is unfair to health care recipients.
When an HMO includes a provision that retains "discretionary author-
ity" to make both health care and administrative decisions it effectively
cements an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review for itself in
court. 132  Therefore, if the HMO contract grants discretionary authority
"deprive[s] the plan of the judicial deference a fiduciary's medical judgment might have obtained if
judicial review of the plan's decision had been immediate." Id.
126. Rush, 536 U.S. at 385.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See id. The Court stated: "Whatever the standards for reviewing benefit denials may be,
they cannot conflict with anything in the text of the statute, which we have read to require a uniform
judicial regime of categories of relief and standards of primary conduct, not a uniformly lenient re-
gime of reviewing benefit determinations." Id. (emphasis added). The Court added that their past
holdings only indicated that when the statute was silent with respect to what review standards are
available (which ERISA is), deferential review could be used if the ERISA plan itself provided that
the "plan's benefit determinations were matters of high or unfettered discretion." Id. at 385-86. See
Firestone Tire, 489 U.S. at 115.
129. ERISA was enacted to .'safeguard... the establishment, operation, and administration'
of employee benefit plans." See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. In enacting the civil
enforcement provision, Congress intended to "provide a uniform federal regime of rights and obli-
gations under ERISA." Rush, 536 U.S. at 381 (internal quotations omitted).
130. See infra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.
131. The Rush Court explained that most HMOs can design HMO contracts to grant plan fidu-
ciaries "discretion" in making benefit decisions. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 384. The Court, in Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989), held that when plans reserve this kind of
discretion to its plan fiduciaries, the courts will judge the decision by a standard of deference. Id.
132. See Kristina B. Pett & Michael S. Metta, Review of Benefits Determination Under Elev-
enth Circuit ERISA Law, 32 FALL-BRIEF 40, 51 (2002). The Eleventh Circuit has held, "when con-
ducting a review of an ERISA benefits denial under an arbitrary and capricious standard (sometimes
2004)
29
Reinhart: Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran: 21 or Bust! Does ERISA Preemp
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
AKRON LAW REVIEW
to HMO administrators, the HMO will prevail in any action brought un-
der ERISA for review of benefit denials, so long as it is able to give
some rational justification for its decision. 133  This is true even if the
overwhelming weight of evidence favors the claimant. 134 Furthermore,
when there is a reservation of discretion and the court reviews the deci-
sion under an arbitrary and capricious standard, most claims are settled
in the summary judgment phase of litigation. 135 The summary judgment
decision essentially denies patients the ability to effectively plead their
case to a judge.1 36
Despite the fact that reservations of discretion can essentially "set-
tle" potential litigation in favor of the HMO before a suit is ever brought,
most HMO participants have little or no say as to the terms of their con-
tracts. 137 Any first year law student will tell you that this is a clear case
used interchangeably with an abuse of discretion standard), the function of the court is to determine
whether there was a reasonable basis for the decision, based upon the facts as known to the adminis-
trator... Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 890 F.2d 1137, 1139 (1 1th Cir. 1989). The Fourth
Circuit has held that in discretionary review cases, a court may only reverse denial if there was a
clear abuse of discretion. Elliot v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 605 (4th Cir. 1999). "Under this
abuse of discretion standard, the claim administrator's decision will not be disturbed if it 'is the re-
sult of a deliberate, principled reasoning process and if it is supported by substantial evidence."' Id.
(quoting Brogan v. Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 161 (4th Cir. 1997)). See also Roger C. Siske, et al.,
What's New in Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current Case and Other Developments, SH006
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 9 (2002).
133. Mark D. DeBofsky, So You're Stuck With ERISA ... Now What?, TRIAL MAG., Oct. 1,
2002, at 49, available at 2002 WL 15116063. A decision is found to be arbitrary and capricious
"where the decision is in bad faith, not supported by substantial evidence, or erroneous on a ques-
tion of law." Williamson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 943 F. Supp. 1226, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing
Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867
(7th Cir. 1996) (stating an abuse of discretion found when a decision is "not just clearly incorrect
but downright unreasonable"). "Further, an abuse of discretion may be found where an ERISA plan
administrator makes a decision that 'conflicts with the plain language of the plan."' DeBofsky, su-
pra. (citing Saffle v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 85 F.3d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1996). See, e.g., Dodson v.
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 109 F.3d 436, 439 (8th Cir. 1997) (asserting that abuse of
discretion may also be found in welfare benefit claims where the plan administrator seeks to place
greater weight on the opinions of reviewing physicians than on the opinions of treating and examin-
ing doctors); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 901 (8th Cir. 1996).
134. DeBofsky, supra note 133.
135. Id. "Indeed, usually there is no trial. In the typical situation - where there is a reservation
of discretion and court review is deferential-most benefit claims under ERISA are resolved by
summary judgment." Id. Arbitrary and capricious cases are amenable to summary judgment reso-
lution. See Pett & Metta, supra note 132, at 51. But see Debofsky, supra note 133 (stating that "[i]f
the standard of review is de novo, however, a 'trial' will consist of the court's reviewing the claim
record and weighing that evidence").
136. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
137. See Richard Alexander, When an Insurance Company Breaches its Contract, Findlaw,
available at http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00083/002875/title/Subject/topic... /contract-
slaw_1 10.
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of unequal bargaining power.' 38 We don't allow this sort of unconscion-
able activity to be upheld in other routine contract situations, so why do
we tolerate it in a field as important as American healthcare?
139
The Rush decision gives states the opportunity to protect people by
enacting legislation that prevents HMOs from contracting such broad
discretion to itself when the participants have virtually no say in the mat-
ter.' 40  The result is that state regulations barring HMOs from writing
contracts that grant HMO administrators discretionary authority to inter-
pret the HMO contract will effectively subject adverse benefit determi-
138. See EDWARD J. MURPHY, ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 342 (5th ed. 1997). See
also Arthur M. Kaufman & Ross Babbitt, The Mutuality Doctrine in the Arbitration Agreements.
The Elephant in the Road, 22 FALL FRANCH. L.J. 101, 104 (2002). "Procedural unconscionability
goes to the failure in the bargaining process that leads to oppression or surprise due to unequal bar-
gaining power." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "When one party has a substantially more pow-
erful bargaining position, this prong investigates whether that party used its greater power in an un-
fair manner against the weaker actor." Id.
139. For examples of disapproval of contractual unconscionability, see Diane W. Savage, Per-
formance Warranties in Computer Contracts, Findlaw, available at http://library.lp.findlaw.com/
articles/file/00009/003349/title/Subject/topic.. /contractslaw__I 1. The author gives an example
of when Congress has stepped in to alleviate some of the potential abuses of large business. Id. An
example of this is the Magnuson-Moss Act, enacted by Congress in 1975. Id. The Act was enacted
in response to the widespread misuse by merchants of express warranties and disclaimers. Id. It
forced merchants to contract by specific guidelines. Id. There is no equivalent protection to par-
ticipants under insurance contracts. Id. An example of a situation that closely resembles HMO con-
tract "negotiations" was seen in A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 124-25 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982), where the court held that a contract was unconscionable because the contract was a
printed form contract, there was ample evidence of unequal bargaining power, and there was a lack
of any real negotiation over contract terms. Id. This sounds an awful lot like the traditional insur-
ance "negotiations." See Kaufman & Babbitt, supra note 138.
140. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 386 (2002). The Rush Court
stated that "[independent review] prohibits designing an insurance contract so as to accord unfet-
tered discretion to the insurer to interpret the contract's terms." Id. The Court went on to state that
there is no differece between the mandated-benefits statutes and statutes prohibiting the denial of
claims solely on the ground of un-timeliness which the Court had sustained in the past. Id. It
should be noted that independent review statutes usually call for a reviewer to interpret the terms
already written into a contract. See id. at 381 n. 11. For example, in Rush the reviewer was called to
decide what was "medically necessary" treatment because the HMO contract guaranteed that "medi-
cally necessary" treatment would be provided. Id. at 380. However, an HMO is under no obliga-
tion to make that kind of guarantee; therefore, if the contract had said nothing about guaranteeing
"medically necessary treatments," then the reviewer would have had to find for the HMO under the
terms of the contract. See id. at n. 10. What this tells us is that HMOs may get around these inde-
pendent review statutes by simply re-wording the insurance contracts to no longer guarantee medi-
cally necessary service. See id. Of course, one may think that no one would sign up with a contract
like that, but it must be remembered that, unlike other free markets, changing insurance providers is
not easy when most people are stuck with what their employer provides. See Joseph Luchok, New
Survey Shows Employment is Key Factor to Obtaining Health Coverage, Health Insurance Associa-
tion of America (2000), available at http://www.hiaa.or/news/newsitem.cfm?ContentlD=367 (stat-
ing that nearly seventy-four percent of workers are offered health insurance from their employers
and nearly sixty-three percent accept it).
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nations to de novo review by the courts. 14 1 Independent review statutes
are an example of state regulations that have this effect.'4 2 This will al-
low patients to fully present their claims before a court and allow the
court to determine the issue as though for the first time. 143 The dissent in
Rush argues that the ultimate effect of de novo review will result in the
courts ruling (in a subsequent suit for benefits) in accordance with the
decision of the independent reviewer. 144 Ironically, if the dissent is cor-
rect, this effectively puts HMOs in the position that patients have been in
for years. Instead of the HMO having the upper hand in court under a
reservation of discretionary authority, the patient will now enjoy that
same sort of discretion when the independent reviewer decides that a
given procedure is medically necessary. 1
45
2. Independent Review Helps Resuscitatethe Doctor-Patient
Relationship
146
The net effect of independent review legislation is that it gives plan
participants a vehicle to assert their own advocating powers. Once upon
a time, doctors and patients had relationships built on trust. 14 7 Doctors
were advocates for patients because they knew that if a patient was not
141. Roger C. Siske, et al, Selections from What's New in Employee Benefits -A Summary of
Current Cases and Other Developments, VMD 1107 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 361 (Nov. 7, 2002).
142. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 384-86.
143. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (7th ed. 1999). Black's defines hearing "de novo" as
(1) A reviewing court's suspension of a lower court's findings and determination of the issue as
though for the first time and (2) A new hearing of a matter, conducted as if the original hearing had
not taken place. Id. In the case of HMO reviews, the "original hearing" would be the internal re-
view by HMO administrators as provided in the HMO contract itself. See Id.
144. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 395-96. The dissent states that "[c]ontrary to the majority's charac-
terization of § 4-10 as nothing more than a state law regarding medical standards, it is in fact a bind-
ing determination of whether benefits are due." Id. (citation omitted). Rush also argues, "[i]f a plan
should continue to balk at providing a service the [independent] reviewer has found to medically
necessary, the reviewer's determination could carry great weight in a subsequent suit for benefits
under § 1132(a) [of ERISA]." Id. at 384 (footnote omitted).
145. See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
146. For an extensive analysis of the importance of the doctor-patient relationship and why,
under a managed care system of health care, we can not have it anymore, see The Grand Unification
Theory of Health Care, YOUR DOCTOR IN THE FAMILY, available at http://www. yourdoctorinthe-
family.com/grandtheory/section 12.htm (giving a comprehensive analysis of why destroying the doc-
tor-patient relationship is a necessary evil of managed care).
147. See id.; Megan H. Johnson, The Routinization of Health Care and the Professional Call-
ing, Dialogues@RU, Spring 2002, available at http://dialogues.rutgers.edu/ stu-
dents/mjohnson/mjohnson_l.html. "Doctors can no longer do what they morally feel is best for
their patients; rather, they must prescribe care with the wishes of cost-concerned HMOs in mind,
and are sometimes forced to divert from their personal moral code in the name of business." Id.
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satisfied, they could go to another doctor. 148 HMOs have virtually de-
stroyed the doctor-patient relationship by forcing patients to see particu-
lar doctors and forcing doctors to perform particular procedures. 149  Al-
though many doctors may be stuck with HMO rules, independent review
statutes will allow patients to advocate for themselves the way doctors
once advocated for them. 150  A recent North Carolina Law Review arti-
cle suggests that it is the physician's oath, the HMO Act, and HMO con-
tracting regulations that ensure patients will receive access to medically
necessary procedures despite cost control measures taken by the
HMO.' 51 Independent review statutes are exactly the kind of "contract-
148. See Johnson, supra note 147 (referencing the strained doctor-patient relationship and how
HMO will help patients recapture some of their rights).
149. See David T. Gordon, Hippocrates or Hypocrisy?, N.U. MAGAZINE ONLINE, Jan. 2000,
available at http://www.numag.neu.edu/0001/health.html. Gordon states:
In many cases, doctors working for managed care organizations are damned if they do,
damned if they don't. They might work under gag orders, which forbid them to discuss
with patients the full range of options for care. They might have their pay docked for
playing it safe with a patient's health and ordering an extra night of hospitalization, an
expense an HMO case manager might later deem unnecessary. They might be restricted
in the amount of time they can spend with each patient, forcing abrupt and perhaps in-
complete doctor-patient communication. Given the level of public distrust of managed
care organizations, doctors might also encounter patients who are guarded and suspi-
cious or who may exaggerate symptoms in an effort to secure a greater level of care. If
patients feel they have to lie-or to exaggerate their own symptoms-they may cause a be-
fuddled doctor to order up tests that honest communication would have rendered unnec-
essary. If either doctors or patients are dishonest, the result will likely be the same: sick
people won't get the care they need.
Id. See also Amir Zaman, Doctor-Patient Relationship Becoming More Businesslike, WEAC
NEWS, June 1996, available at http://www.weac.org/News/JUNE96/lnsure.htm (opining that the
relationship between doctors and patients is changing and discussing how one employee's longtime
personal doctor refused to join her HMO thus forcing her to search for another doctor). "The doc-
tor-patient relationship is getting very businesslike." Id. But see GAO Releases First Study of So-
Called "Gag Rules," U.S. REP. POLICY COMM., Sept. 24, 1997, available at http://rpc.senate.gov/
-rpc/releases/1997/GAOgag-jt.htm (relaying information regarding a study that casts doubt of im-
pact on Doctor-Patient Relationship by indicating that gag clauses are not likely to impact a physi-
cian's practice).
150. See Tanya Albert, Doctors Applaud Supreme Court's HMO Review Ruling, AMEDNEWS,
July 15, 2002 avaiable at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_02/gvl20708.htm (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003). "It (the Rush decision) is a major victory for America's patients and their
physicians." Id. (quoting American Medical Association President-elect Donald J. Palmisano,
M.D.). Albert goes on to write that the decision will improve doctor-patient relationships. Id.
Mark Rust, an attorney for Moran, stated that "[t]he decision will return some confidence to patients
whose primary care physicians tell them a particular treatment is medically necessary while a physi-
cian from their health care plan tells them it is not." Id. "This ruling helps ensure that our patients
get the best care possible." Id. (quoting Warren A. Jones, M.D., American Academy of Family
Physicians president).
151. Matthew J. Binette, Comment, Patient's Bill of Rights: Legislative Cure-All or Prescrip-
tion for Disaster?, 81 N.C. L. REv. 653, 663 (2003) (explaining the history behind the HMO model
of health care by and how HMO cost control measures are offset by physician's oath, HMO Act,
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ing regulations" needed to counterbalance the cost control measures that
are at the heart of HMO plans. They give patients an additional safe-
guard when dealing with HMO administrators that allows them to feel
like they have some control over their own healthcare.
3. Patients are Not Being Given "Blank Checks"
Despite what HMO officials would have us believe, the decision in
Rush will not give patients the right to unlimited damages under state
laws. Opponents of state regulations of insurance for ERISA qualified
plans adamantly contend that allowing states to interfere will result in
high damage awards. 152  It is further argued that those damage awards
will translate into one of two potential results: (1) higher health care
costs that may cause employers to stop offering employer sponsored
healthcare, 153 or (2) the bankruptcy of HMOs. This fear is greatly over-
and regulations).
152. See HIAA Statement on Supreme Court Decision in Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, June
20, 2002, available at http://www.hiaa.org/news/newsitem.cfmContentlD=19416. The HIAA re-
leased a statement following the Rush decision stating:
The Supreme Court's decision today will add greater cost and complexity to health in-
surance coverage. The nation's health insurers have never opposed external review. On
the contrary, we developed and used external review long before states required it. But
having [fifty] different state standards governing how external review is practiced will
mean people covered under a multi-state plan will not have the same benefits. The great
danger is that with costs already skyrocketing, employers navigating varying state laws
may be forced to reconsider whether they will offer health insurance for their employees.
Id. See also Richard L. Huber, Expanding Liability Harmful, USA TODAY, Oct. 19,1998, available
at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/USAToday (estimating that expansion of liability alone could in-
crease premiums as much as eight or nine percent). But see HMOs Profits Increase 162% During
First Quarter of 2002, SPENCERNET, available at http://www.spencernet.com/Archive/feature
011503.html#Anchorl4210 (giving statistics showing a recorded 868 million dollar profit for
HMOs in 2002); Managing to Make a Profit, AMEDNEWS, Marchl8, 2002, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_01/biccO3l8.htm (giving a break-down of each
major HMO's profit for 2001).
153. See Harvard Law Review Assoc., H. Preemption, 116 HARv. L. REv. 412,413 (2002).
This holding increases the costs of insuring funding employee benefit plans, a burden
employers may easily avoid by switching to self-funded plans. Thus, Moran, in princi-
ple, expands the scope of state regulation by narrowing federal preemption of state in-
surance regulation but, in practice, may decrease the number of employee benefit plans
subject to such regulation.
Id. See also Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 402 (2002). The dissent argued:
[T]he Court would do well to remember that no employer is required to provide any
health benefit plan under ERISA and that the entire advent of managed care, and the
genesis of HMOs, stemmed from spiraling health costs. To the extent that independent
review provisions such as § 4-10 make it more likely that HMOs will have to subsidize
beneficiaries' treatments of choice, they undermine the ability of HMOs to control costs,
which, in turn, undermines the ability of employers to provide health care coverage for
employees.
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stated in view of the Rush decision.
The majority in Rush held that any state law remedy that conflicts
with ERISA's civil enforcement provision would be preempted by
ERISA.1 54  Thus, state laws may not allow damages that would not be
allowed under ERISA. Punitive damages have clearly been held to be in
direct conflict with ERISA's civil enforcement provision and thus pre-
empted.1
55
Furthermore, HMOs argue that even if excessive damages aren't al-
lowed, the mere fact that a patient can obtain external review will raise
costs. 156 It is argued that the opinion of the independent reviewer is held
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 377. The Court stated:
Although we have yet to encounter a forced choice between the congressional policies of
exclusively federal remedies and the "reservation of the business of insurance to the
States," we have anticipated such a conflict, with the state insurance regulation losing
out if it allows plan participants "to obtain remedies.., that Congress rejected in
ERISA."
Id. (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (internal citations omitted)).
155. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47. Note that the Court in Rush made a deliberate choice not to
overrule Pilot Life because they agreed with the holding and the dictum of that case. Id. Rather, the
Court chose to limit the applicability. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 381. The Court recognized that allow-
ing such things as consequential and monetary damages for breach would simply be too far from the
congressional intent to withstand preemption. Id. at 378. See also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (holding that allowing a claim that essentially converted the rem-
edy from an equitable one under ERISA to a legal one for money damages was preempted because
it conflicted with ERISA's civil enforcement provision); Joyce Krutick Craig, Managed Care
Grievance Procedures: The Dilemma and the Cure, 21 J. Nat'l Assoc. Admin. L. Judges 336, 345-
47 (2001) (explaining that state law tort claims are preempted under ERISA); Steven Findlay, Hold-
ing HMOs Accountable, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 1997, available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/
USAToday (stating that ERISA does not allow punitive damages); Amednews, Are HMOs on the
Down and Out?, AMEDNEWS, Oct. 15, 2001, available at http://www.ama-ssn.org/sci-
pubs/amnews/pickOl/bicbl 15.htm.
156. See Harv. L. Rev. Assoc., supra note 153, at 413. While the Harvard Law Review article
repeatedly states that the holding in Rush will raise costs of insuring funding employee benefit
plans, it does not specifically state why. See id. One can presume from the article that its authors
believe Rush will open up employee benefit plans to new kinds of state regulations that, prior to
Rush may have been assumed by states to be preempted by ERISA. See id. at 417-21. However,
the authors do not elaborate on any particular type of state regulation that may result. See id. at 421.
The article does discuss a few current state laws that are now being litigated in the federal courts,
which the authors believe will not be preempted as a result of Rush; however, the authors have pro-
vided little to support the contention that states will suddenly adopt new state regulations merely as
a result of the Rush opinion. See id. at 420-21. The authors carelessly and without any support ar-
gue that state legislatures can "reap political benefits from voting on legislation regulating unpopu-
lar HMOs." Id. at 420. Rather, legislatures can reap no benefits from driving up health care costs
with unnecessary regulations; therefore, if regulations are accepted by the legislature, it is because
the benefits of protecting human lives outweigh the potential increased costs. Similarly, Wendy
Mariner writes that the decision "may encourage states to adopt insurance reforms beyond inde-
pendent external review to protect patients." Wendy Mariner, Who Governs HMOs?, 170 N.J.L.J.
679 (2002) (emphasis added).
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in high regard when the participant ultimately seeks ERISA's civil
remedies, and if an independent reviewer finds the procedure to be
"medically necessary," then it will result in a near absolute loss for the
HMO in court. 15 7 This is the same argument that was made by the de-
fense and rejected by the majority Court in Rush.158  Surveys have
shown that nationwide only an average of forty-five percent of health
plan denials of coverage get overturned as a result of independent review
statutes. 159 Furthermore, that same study shows that in the forty-one
states that already have independent review statutes, only a small num-
ber of patients have actually pursued this avenue. 160  Rather, the mere
knowledge that an HMO participant has the power to force an HMO to
submit to independent review may be enough to influence how a health
plan makes decisions earlier in the appeals process, thus eliminating the
need for costly litigation altogether.
1 6
'
157. See supra notes 144-146.
158. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 384-86. But see id. at 396. The dissent in Rush disagreed and said:
[T]he Court of Appeals did not interpret the plan terms or purport to analyze whether the
plan terms or purport to analyze whether the plan fiduciary had engaged in the "full and
fair review" of Moran's claim for benefits that §503(2) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2),
requires. Rather, it rubberstamped the independent medical reviewer's judgment that
Moran's surgery was "medically necessary," granting summary judgment to Moran on
her claim for benefits solely on that basis.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159. Tanya Albert, Few Patients Opt to Appeal HMO Denials, AMEDNEWS, Apr. 8, 2002,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_02/gvsaO4O8.htm. Here is how the
states compare against the forty-five percent national average: Connecticut 72%; Rhode Island 69%;
District of Columbia 67%; Maryland 67%; Georgia 63%; Virginia 60%; Texas 58%; Missouri 52%;
Florida 50%; Hawaii 50%; Indiana 50%; Michigan 50%; New Mexico 50%; Colorado 48%; Ken-
tucky 47%; Kansas 45%; Pennsylvania 44%; Tennessee 44%; New Hampshire 43%; Oklahoma
43%; Iowa 42%; California 40%; Montana 40%; Vermont 40%; New Jersey 39%; Maine 38%;
New York 38%; Ohio 37%; Massachusetts 33%; Illinois 27%; Arizona 21%; Minnesota 21%. Id.
The state laws were too new in Alaska, Delaware, Louisiana, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin to provide data. Id.
160. See Albert supra note 159. Only four thousand patients a year appeal HMO treatment
decisions and denials. Id.
161. See Albert, supra note 159. Albert's article goes on to show that of the small number of
patients who utilize the independent review statutes, on average, 45% of coverage denials were re-
versed nationwide. Id. That ranged from a low of 21% overturned in Arizona to a high of 72% in
Connecticut. Id. Tim Maglione, an Ohio State Medical Association senior director of government
relations, said: "The bigger picture shows it has a sentinel effect on the insurance company's deci-
sion. There is somebody watching over the HMOs, and that is causing the insurers to make better
decisions." Id. The article gives several possible theories for the low use of the independent review
laws, including criticism that the process is too complicated, the belief that there are not that many
conflicts to begin with, and that there are too many hindrances to get through. Id. For example, in
New Jersey, health plan members must endure a two-stage internal review process. Denial during
the first stage can be done over the phone, rather than in writing; therefore, patients are sometimes
confused about the decision. Id.
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Despite Rush's limitation on damage awards, HMO supporters still
argue that the decision "undermines the cost-control function of HMOs
by placing claims decisions outside the hands of HMOs, which internal-
ize and, therefore, have an incentive to control the cost of providing
health care."'' 62 No doubt, these same advocates will use studies show-
ing increasing HMO costs to support the contention that Rush has caused
the increases. I would advise caution before subscribing to this reason-
ing. First, health care costs have been on the rise long before the Su-
preme Court stepped in to allow state regulation. New technology, the
aging baby boomers, and rising prescription drug and hospital costs are
the major culprits of increased health care costs. 163  Second, unfortu-
nately for the HMOs' argument, but fortunately for HMO executives,
most of the big HMOs are very profitable. 164 The average American
should find it ironic that HMOs cry threats of bankruptcy from the hill-
tops while a single chief financial officer for an HMO enjoyed a near
sixteen million dollar salary in 2002.165 While state regulations may in-
crease costs, these are not the costs that are going to drive HMOs out of
business.
166
4. Pegram is Still Good Law: You Can't Sue Your HMO for
Having a Profit Motive
Pegram involved an HMO beneficiary who sued her HMO and
physician alleging medical malpractice and fraud.167  Specifically, the
162. Harv. L. Rev. Assoc., supra note 153, at 417.
163. Julie A. Jacob, Employers can Expect Another Year of Rising Premiums, AMEDNEWS,
Nov. 4, 2002, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_02/bisc 104.htm. A
health care market leader for Hewitt Associates, which conducted the annual survey, "projects that
costs for preferred-provider, point-of-service and indemnity plans will increase an average of 15%,
while costs for HMOs will rise 16%." Id. This data suggests that HMO costs are rising at almost
the same rate as the costs of other systems of health care. Id.
164. See HMOs Profits Increase 162% During First Quarter of2002, Jan. 15, 2003 available
at http://www.spencemet.com/Archive/featureO11503.html#Anchor-14210 (last visited Feb. 20,
2003). In the first three months of 2002, the nation's HMOs reportedly made an $868 million
profit, representing a 162% increase over the same period in 2001. Id. See also Managing to Make
a Profit, AMEDNEWS, March 18, 2002, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-
pubs/amnews/pickO2/biccO318.htm (providing a chart of revenue, financial results, per-share
profit, and medical-loss ratios).
165. News in Brief AMEDNEWS, May 6, 2002 available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-
pubs/amnews/pick_02/bibf05O6.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). Reports come from the Securities
and Exchange Commission filing. Id.
166. See id.
167. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 215 (2000). Cynthia Herdrich suffered a ruptured ap-
pendix after her HMOs physician ordered her to wait eight days so she could schedule an ultrasound
at an HMO clinic. Jamie L. Armitage, Case Note: Pegram v. Herdrich: HMO Physicians as Fiduci-
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plaintiff alleged that a
provision of medical services under the terms of [her HMO], reward-
ing its physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an inherent
or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, since these terms
created an incentive to make decisions in the physician's self-interest,• • • 168
rather than the exclusive interest of plan participants.
The question was whether an HMO, acting through its physicians,
was performing fiduciary acts in making eligibility and treatment deci-
sions. 169 The Pegram Court believed that "rationing of medical care is at
the heart of managed care, and Congress through its encouragement of
HMOs had long sanctioned such rationing.' '170 As a result, the Court
aries, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 341, 348 (2002). Herdrich's health care provider consisted of
three different entities which operated together to form a pre-paid health insurance plan that pro-
vided medical and hospital services. Id. Herdrich was covered under a plan subscription provided
by her husband's employer, State Farm Insurance Company. Id. Herdrich's physician, Lori Pe-
gram, was a physician who contracted under the Carle plan. Id. The events leading up to the Pe-
gram lawsuit began when Herdrich went to see Dr. Pegram complaining of pain in the middle of her
groin. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215. Six days later Dr. Pegram discovered an inflamed mass in Her-
drich's abdomen. Id. However, after finding the mass, Dr. Pegram did not order an ultrasound di-
agnostic procedure at the local hospital, but instead she scheduled Herdrich to have the procedure
eight days later at a facility staffed by Carle. Id. Before the eight days expired, Herdrich's appen-
dix ruptured, causing peritonitis. Id.
168. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 216. Financial incentives are said to be a key to managed care cost-
control efforts. Julie Appleby, Ruling Helps HMO Stock, But More Cases in Wings, USA TODAY,
June 13, 2000, available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/USAToday. "Doctors are often paid a set
amount per patient, per month, whether or not that patient needs treatment." Id. "Proponents say
that that gives doctors an incentive to keep patients healthy, while critics say it means patients get
short-changed." Id. The Pegram Court observed that:
These cost controlling measures are commonly complemented by specific financial in-
centives to physicians, rewarding them for decreasing utilization of health-care services,
and penalizing them for what may be found to be excessive treatment. Hence, in an
HMO system, a physician's financial interest lies in providing less care, not more.
Thomas L. Knight, Pegram v. Herdrich - The Supreme Court HMO Case: While the Supreme Court
Allowed the HMOs to Win a Battle, It May Have Set Them Up to Lose the War, DCBA BRIEF
ONLINE, September 2000, available at http://www.dcba.org/brief/sepissue/2000/artl0900.htm
(quoting Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219 (citation omitted)). "The Court acknowledged that the only check
on the influence of the physician's financial interest to provide less care is the doctor's professional
obligation to provide the covered services with a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the pa-
tient's interest." Id.
169. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 217; Supreme Court Rules on Suing MCOs Under ERISA,
MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW SITE, available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/
hmo/2000 US herdrich review.htm.
170. Borzi & Machiz, supra note 28, at 408. See also Armitage, supra note 167. In order to
carry out the goal of increasing profits and minimizing expenses, some HMOs have instituted cost
containment procedures that provide physicians financial incentives to curtail referrals to specialists
or non-HMO physicians, to reduce testing, and to choose the cheapest form of treatment available.
See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 591 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that
"HMOs often can provide healthcare at lower cost by stressing preventative care, controlling costs,
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found that the HMO had no fiduciary duties to its member patients when
making eligibility or mixed eligibility and medical decisions. 171 The de-
cision in Rush does not change the holding in Pegram. 72 An HMO pa-
tient still cannot sue their HMO simply because the HMO provides fi-
and driving hard bargains with doctors or hospitals (who thereby obtain more patients in exchange
for reduced charge.)"). Primary care physicians are used as "gatekeepers" to monitor the care of the
enrollees by approving or disapproving the referral of care such as seeing specialists or the length of
the patients hospital stay. Id. It is common for some HMO physicians to deny referrals or fail to
prescribe tests in order to preserve their year end bonuses and capitation benefits. James P. Duffy,
Note, HMO Doctors as ERISA Fiduciaries: A Bankruptcy Perspective, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
125, 129-30 (2000). "The practice of discouraging usage of expensive services, and thus making
health care particularly inconvenient for the ill, is openly discussed as a legitimate technique among
health care managers. A 1994 article in Journal of Health Care Marketing is particularly interesting
in this regard. This article praises several useful techniques that HMOs have developed for discour-
aging the use of (or "demarketing") costly health care services." The Grand Unification Theory of
Health Care: Portrait of a Modern HMO, (2000), available at http://www.yourdoctorinthefam-
ily.com/grandtheory/section5_4.htm. The article explains:
Decreasing accessibility to services.., can be accomplished by "managing" the infor-
mation distributed to patients regarding services available and how to access them. For
example, an organization might excessively promote less-costly preventive proce-
dures ... and repress information about other elective and/or expensive services. In ad-
dition, providers can strategically locate and number specific services to make them easy
(e.g., primary care) or difficult (e.g., specialists) to utilize. Furthermore, lag peri-
ods ... also serve as containment strategies. Lags may be affected by the need for refer-
rals, limited number of contracted specialists, restricted or inconvenient appointment
availability, and increased office-visit waiting periods.
Id. (quoting Borkowski NM, Demarketing of Health Services, JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE
MARKETING 1994;14:12). Some examples previously litigated include a baby suffering from inju-
ries in childbirth after the HMO denied the mother a much needed ultrasound because of a testing
policy, and a primary care physician whose patient died because he dissuaded him from visiting a
cardiologist in order to preserve the physician's minimum referral award. Shea v. Esentsten, 107
F.3d 625, 626-628 (8th Cir. 1997). Although courts have sanctioned some cost reduction systems,
courts have held that they do not need to be disclosed unless the patient asks directly about them.
Id. The Supreme Court did acknowledge that rationing might have been done poorly in [Pegram],
but nonetheless found that rationing is fundamental to managed care and that it was approved by
Congress. MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW SITE, supra note 169.
171. The Court's specific holding in Pegram was that Congress did not intend the fiduciary
obligation of ERISA (the federal act regulating federally funded benefit plans) to apply to HMO
treatment decisions under an ERISA benefit plan. Therefore, a patient cannot bring a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty under that ERISA provision for a treatment decision which injures the pa-
tient. Knight, supra note 168. Knight goes on to describe the holding as "pretty narrow" because
"most medical negligence attorneys have not tried to bring any ERISA breach of fiduciary duty
claims." Id. Knight explains that this is "understandable, since, in all probability the remedies
would be those under the ERISA fiduciary provision, and they would not really help the clients"
because they are limited to civil remedies. Id. Although the decision is beneficial to HMOs, there is
nothing in the decision that forecloses patients from bringing traditional medical negligence claims
against doctors and hospitals. Id.
172. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359-387 (2002). The decision in
Pegram "was not about preemption, but about the scope of the fiduciary rules." Borzi & Machiz,
supra note 28, at 409.
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nancial incentives or has a profit seeking motive.
5. Uniformity is Still an Accomplished Objective 173
It is well established that a main objective of ERISA was to estab-
lish a uniform set of regulations with respect to employee welfare bene-
fits.' 74  This objective has not been lost in Rush's majority opinion.175
State regulations are still not permitted to supplant or supplement
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. 176  This maintains a degree of
uniformity in relation to actual claims that can be brought against
HMOs. Congress could not have intended that there be no variation in
state regulations because variations are a predictable result of preserving
power to the states through the savings clause. 
77
Furthermore, forty-two states already have independent review
statutes, suggesting that the presence of these statutes is practically uni-
form across the country.' 78  While the actual procedures may differ
173. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the dissent in Rush, argued that the majority ruling
"eviscerate[d] the uniformity of ERISA remedies." Rush, 536 U.S. at 389. See Janet L. Holt, Su-
preme Court Approves State Review of HMO Decisions; Congress Stalls, TRIAL MAG., Sept. 1,
2002, at 12 available at 2002 WL 15116022. "[Moran's] attorney Joshua Spielberg... [said]
'HMOs dress up their opposition to health care legislation in an argument that ERISA should pre-
empt state laws for the sake of uniformity' ... 'But what they really want is total control."' Id.
174. Joshua Michael Kaye, Comment, Closing the Lid on Pandora's Box: ERISA Preemption
of Tort Actions Against Managed Care Organizations in State Courts, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 373,
385-386 (2000). "Looking to ERISA's legislative history, the Court noted that Congress' aim 'was
to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of em-
ployee benefit plans."' Id. (quoting N. Y. Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659 (1995)). See also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 1, 12 (1973)); Bogan, supra note 74, at 980 (quoting congressmen
as saying that the purpose of ERISA was to eliminate conflicting and inconsistent state and local
regulation); Paredes, supra note 53, at 237 (stating "[t]o achieve its objective, Congress established
in ERISA various uniform standards to regulate benefit plans[]").
175. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 374-87. "Whatever the standards for reviewing benefit denials may
be, they cannot conflict with anything in the text of the statute, which we have read to require a uni-
form judicial regime of categories of relief and standards of primary conduct, not a uniformly leni-
ent regime of reviewing benefit determinations." Id. at 385. "[W]e hold that the feature of § 4-10
that provides a different standard of review with respect to mixed eligibility decisions from what
would be available in court is not enough to create a conflict that undermines congressional policy
in favor of uniformity of remedies." Id. at 386 n.17.
176. Id. at 377. "[T]he state insurance regulation [will] loste] out if it allows plan participants
'to obtain remedies.., that Congress rejected in ERISA."' Id. (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
177. Rush, 536 U.S. at 381. "Such disuniformities... are the inevitable result of the congres-
sional decision to 'save' local insurance regulation. Arguments as to the wisdom of these policy
choices must be directed at Congress." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724,747 (1985).
178. See Albert, supra note 159.
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across the states, these procedures are not likely to impose burdens on
plan administration.179 "It is the HMO contracting with a plan, and not
the plan itself, that will be subject to these regulations, and every HMO
will have to establish procedures for conforming with the local laws, re-
gardless of what [the] Court may think ERISA forbids."'"8 This means
that there will be no "special burden of compliance upon an ERISA plan
beyond what the HMO has already provided for."'
18 1
B. Rush Only Slows the Bleeding for Some
Many commentators express concern that Rush is hardly the "cure
all" for which patients have hoped. 82 For one thing, there are people in
eight states that do not have access to independent review statutes.
1 83
Second, Pegram may still be an insurmountable obstacle to filing a suit
against an HMO.184 Third, many HMOs can get around review statutes
by avoiding overt denials. 185 For example, HMO plans may give physi-
cians incentives for avoiding referrals that may have led to a recommen-
dation that the HMO did not want to pay for.' 86 Fourth, many patients
are not aware of the independent review statutes or find them too confus-
179. American Assn. of Health Plans President and CEO Karen Ignagni said health plans had a
history of supporting external review laws and would continue to do so. But, she said the associa-
tion is unhappy with the ruling because it doesn't provide patients with uniform, national standards
and guidelines for external review: "From our perspective it's a setback for patients."
Id. However, Ron Pollack, executive director of FamiliesUSA, opposes such statements saying,
"[tihe only way to establish a federal review right.., is through federal legislation, and 'the man-
aged care industry has consistently opposed passage of a national patients' bill of rights."' Holt,
supra note 173.
180. Rush, 536 U.S. at 381 n.l l. "[A]lthough the added compliance cost to the HMO may
ultimately be passed on to the ERISA plan," the Court has held before "that such 'indirect economic
effects' are not enough to preempt state regulation even outside of the insurance context." Id. (quot-
ing N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995)
(internal citations omitted)). The Court notes that it is possible for a state to enact a kind of inde-
pendent review that might result in a burden so high as to undermine the purpose of uniformity, but
they declined to answer that question because the Illinois statute was not such a statute. Id.
181. Rush, 536U.S. at381n.ll.
182. See, e.g., Nevers, supra note 70; Albert, supra note 150; Holt, supra note 173; Supreme
Court Won't Fix All ERISA Woes, AMEDNEWS, Feb. 12, 2001, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/amn_01/edsa02I2.htm.
183. See Albert, supra note 159. See also, Albert supra note 150; Holt, supra note 173. Albert
goes on to point out that the Rush decision only covers the 73 million patients in health plans that
carry the insurance risk. Id. There are 56 million more patients in self-funded plans that are not
guaranteed anything by the Rush decision. Id.
184. See supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
185. Holt, supra note 173.
186. See id. See also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (holding that you cannot sue an
HMO for having a profit-seeking motive).
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ing to provide effective assistance. 87  Finally, in a footnote, the Rush
Court discretely suggests how HMOs can completely avoid problems.
188
While explaining the role of the court in enforcing independent review
statutes, the majority points out that Rush chose to guarantee "medically
necessary services," and it is for that reason that Rush was obligated to
provide the service under the Illinois statute. 189 "But insurance contracts
do not have to contain such guarantees."' 90 The majority goes on to
specify how insurance contracts might be written to avoid making such
guarantees for experimental treatments, and they suggest that even if the
contracts are not modified, the reviewer's judgment could still poten-
tially be challenged as inaccurate or biased. 191 While this footnote has
seemingly gone unnoticed by Rush commentators, one can be certain
that it has not gone unnoticed by HMO providers. In the end it seems
certain, as many patient advocates have noted, "the right to review...
187. See Holt, supra note 173. See also Albert, supra note 150 (stating that the media attention
generated by the ruling in Rush has created an awareness among patients and physicians who did
not realize they had an external review right).
188. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 380 n.l0.
189. Id. In explaining the role of the court in enforcing independent review statutes, the Court
stated:
This is not to say that the court would have no role beyond ordering compliance with the
reviewer's determination. The court would have the responsibility, for example, to fash-
ion appropriate relief, or to determine whether other aspects of the plan (beyond the
"medical necessity" of a particular treatment) affect the relative rights of the parties.
Rush, for example, has chosen to guarantee medically necessary services to plan partici-
pants. For that reason, to the extent § 4-10 may render the independent reviewer the fi-
nal word on what is necessary, Rush is obligated to provide the service.
Id. (citation omitted).
190. Id.
191. Rush, 536 U.S. at 380 n.10. Specifically, the Court said that not all insurance contracts
guarantee medically necessary services. Id.
Some, for instance, guarantee medically necessary care, but then modify that obligation
by excluding experimental procedures from coverage. Obviously, § 4-10 does not have
anything to say about whether a proposed procedure is experimental. There is also the
possibility, though we do not decide the issue today, that a reviewer's judgment could be
challenged as inaccurate or biased, just as the decision of a plan fiduciary might be so
challenged.
Id. For an example of an insurance contract that excludes experimental procedures, see Tillery v.
Hoffnan Enclosures, Inc., 280 F.3d 1192, 1199 (8th Cir. 2002) where the court denied an ERISA
plan beneficiary's claim for medical expense for bowel transplant surgery on the basis that the sur-
gery was experimental and the plan's exclusion for experimental procedures was reasonable. The
court found that the decision was reasonable because: (I) Denial was consistent with goal of plan to
maximize benefits to all covered persons; (2) Exclusion for experimental procedures did not render
plan's coverage for medically necessary procedures meaningless; (3) Denial did not conflict with
any substantive or procedural requirements under ERISA; (4) Beneficiary's request was the first and
only request for bowel transplant under the plan; and (5) The plan expressly excluded experimental
procedures. Id. at 1199-1200.
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will not be secure until Congress passes a national patient's bill of
rights."
'1 92
C. The Future for State Laws that Regulate HMOs
1. Bad-Faith Statutes in the Aftermath of the Rush Decision
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has recently issued conflicting
opinions on whether Pennsylvania's bad faith statute was preempted by
ERISA in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Rush.193 Plaintiffs were
excited by the decision in Rosenbaum v. UNUMLife Ins. Cot94 that held
ERISA does not preempt a bad faith claim. t95 Senior U.S. District Court
192. Holt, supra note 173. "All this means that 'passage of a national patients' bill of rights is
critical ... [w]e need to create a federal right to review of HMO treatment decisions that applies to
everyone, irrespective of where they live."' Id. (quoting Ron Pollack, Executive Director of Famili-
esUSA). There are other patient protection activities that have evolved to "promote cost effective,
quality, accessible health care through non-judicial forums." Nevers, supra note 70, at 535. Nevers
lists several kinds of activities that are designed to fill in the gaps until a national system of health
care steps in. See id. The list includes the "use of health care ombudsman to resolve complaints
and improve access to care or dispute resolution processes such as mediation." Id. However,
Nevers also points out that the right to sue is not what we should be striving for because it only pro-
vides remedies "after poor care has been rendered but is limited in effectuating excellent medical
care at the time services are rendered." Id.
193. Donald P. Carleen, Preempting Pennsylvania's Bad Faith Statute, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18,
2002, at 3. Carleen writes:
While the Eastern District had previously - and consistently - held that the statute did
not survive preemption, the tide began to shift after two Supreme Court decisions held
that certain state laws relating to employee benefit plans nevertheless fall within
ERISA's saving clause as 'regulations of insurance.' Although it appears that the Eastern
District is quickly reassuming its original position in favor of ERISA preemption, the re-
cent conflict in the district may ultimately provide the Supreme Court with an opportu-
nity to dispel any uncertainty on the scope of ERISA's saving clause and to confirm the
exclusivity of the civil enforcement scheme provided under the federal statute.
Id. See also Andrew Brownstein, Federal Judges Spar Over Whether ERISA Allows Punitive
Damages, 38-NOV TRIAL 84 (2002); Shannon P. Duffy, Will 3rd Circuit Resolve ERISA Issue?
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 20, 2002, at 3; Shannon P. Duffy, Dueling Rulings. Federal
Judges Contradict Each Other in ERISA Decisions, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv., Aug. 26, 2002, at
9; David S. Senoff, ERISA and Bad Faith: Strange Bedfellows or a Perfect Match? Rosenbaum
Makes Insurers Liable for their Actions, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 12, 2002, at 6.
194. Rosenbaum v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., No. 01-6758 (E.D.Pa. July 29, 2002).
195. Duffy, 3rd Circuit, supra note 193. The lawyer for the plaintiff in Rosenbaum com-
mented, "[I]t's a brand new day." Id. The Pennsylvania bad faith statute provides that in an action
arising under an insurance policy,
if the court finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith toward the insured, the court may
take all of the following actions: (1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from the
date the claim was made by the insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of interest
plus three percent. (2) Award punitive damages against the insurer. (3) Assess court
costs and attorney's fees against the insurer.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (1998).
2004]
43
Reinhart: Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran: 21 or Bust! Does ERISA Preemp
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Judge Clarence Newcomer relied on UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v.
Ward and the decision in Rush to hold that the bad faith statute "regu-
lates insurance" for the purposes of the saving clause.' 96 Unfortunately,
Newcomer did not address the potential conflict between the remedies
available under ERISA and those available under the bad faith stat-
utes. 197
Newcomer's avoidance of the potential conflict between remedies
in ERISA and remedies available from bad faith statutes became the dis-
tinguishing factor when U.S. District Court Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter
decided Sprecher v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare Inc. 198 Buckwalter held the
bad faith law was preempted by ERISA because it provided for punitive
damages. 99 Buckwalter wrote, "because Pennsylvania's bad faith stat-
ute provides a form of ultimate relief in a judicial forum that adds to the
judicial remedies provided by ERISA, it is incompatible with ERISA's
exclusive enforcement scheme. 2 °°
196. Rosenbaum, No. 01-6758 (E.D.Pa. July 29, 2002). See generally Rush Prudential HMO
Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (using the McCarran-Ferguson factors to analyze a state stat-
ute); UNUM Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (applying the Commonsense / McCarran-
Ferguson Test). Newcomer stated that there was a "new trend in the federal law" toward relaxing
the McCarran-Ferguson factors. Brownstein, supra note 193, at 85. He went on to say that the Jus-
tices in those cases "explained that the savings clause can protect a state law from preemption even
if it does not meet all three factors of the McCarran-Ferguson test when deciding whether the regu-
lation fits within the business of insurance." Duffy, Dueling Rulings, supra note 193. Newcomer
found that the Pennsylvania bad faith statute satisfied the second and the third factors by creating a
mandatory contract term providing the insured with the right to pursue special remedies. Carleen,
supra note 193. Furthermore, Newcomer distinguished the bad faith statutes from the statute at is-
sue in Pilot Life, finding that the bad faith statute was directed specifically for use by the insurance
industry. Id.
197. Many patient's rights supporters seem to have forgotten that Rush also restated that a law
providing an alternative remedy to those available in ERISA would be preempted despite being a
law that "regulates insurance" within the meaning of the savings clause. Rush, 536 U.S. at 355.
Judge Newcomer probably came to the wrong holding as a result of ignoring this important portion
of Rush because allowing punitive damages will be most likely be considered an "alternative rem-
edy" that conflicts with ERISA's civil enforcement provision based on the Court's dictum in Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (declining to find an implied cause of action for
punitive damages in the civil enforcement provision).
198. Sprecher v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare Inc., No. 02-00580 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 19, 2002).
199. Id. at 7.
200. Id. at 7 (finding that the bad faith statute fell within the Pilot Life categorical preemption).
See also Duffy, Dueling Rulings, supra note 193. In addition to the fact that the bad faith statute
provided remedies not available in ERISA, Buckwalter also took issue with Newcomer's classifica-
tion of bad faith statutes as "regulating insurance" within the meaning of the saving clause. Id.
While agreeing that the UNUM decision and the Rush decision relaxed the standard regarding the
McCarran-Ferguson factors, Buckwalter disagreed that the bad faith statutes even met two of the
factors. Id. Buckwalter argued that the Justices in Ward held California's notice-prejudice rule met
the McCarran-Ferguson's second factor because it effectively created a mandatory contract term
and thus, dictated the terms of the relationship. Id. And in the Rush decision, the Justices held that
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It appears that Buckwalter's view is the majority view of his col-
leagues on the federal bench in Philadelphia. In Kirkhuff v. Lincoln
Technical Inst. Inc., Judge Harvey Bartle, who concurred in the Sprecher
opinion, also held that Pennsylvania's bad faith statute was preempted
by virtue of ERISA's exclusive remedial scheme. 201 Furthermore, Judge
Michael Baylson, ruling in Bell v. UNUM Provident Corp., and Judge
Jay C. Waldman, ruling in Smith v. Continental Casualty Co., took issue
with Newcomer's reliance on the Ward and Rush decisions.20 2
2. Why Sprecher and Kirkhuff Correctly Interpret Rush
Commentators are calling on the Supreme Court to answer the
question of what the dictum of Pilot Life and Rush really referred to.2
03
the Illinois law was not preempted because it required HMOs to provide a mechanism for review by
an independent physician when the patient's primary care physician and HMO disagreed about the
medical necessity of a treatment by the primary care physician. Id. Rush found that this review
affected the "policy relationship" between HMOs and covered persons because it provided a legal
right to the insured and enforceable against the HMO. Id. By contrast, Buckwalter said that the bad
faith statute does not alter the terms of the contract between the insurer and the insured because in-
surers already have an obligation to act in good faith. Id. It does not change the bargain between
the insured and the insurer. Id. But see Senoff, supra note 193.
While it has long been established that insurers in Pennsylvania owe a duty of good faith
to their insureds, until the passage of the bad faith statute there existed no cause of action
to enforce that duty. After the passage of the bad faith statute, insureds in Pennsylvania
were given the right to seek redress for an insurer's bad faith acts and obtain the reme-
dies proscribed. Accordingly, the statute had the effect of "providing a legal right to the
insured, enforceable against" the insurer to seek redress for the insurer's bad faith, which
was not contained in the insurance policy itself. By creating a right to bring a cause of
action against the insurer for damages, the bad faith statute created a new mandatory
contract term.
Id.
201. Kirkuffv. Lincoln Technical Inst., Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 572 (E.D.Pa. 2002).
202. See Bell v. UNUMProvident Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 692, 699-700 (E.D.Pa. 2002) (distin-
guishing Pilot Life because it specifically concerned bad-faith claims while Ward and Rush did not).
Judge Baylson also noted that "there [was] not a whisper in either Ward or Rush which purport[ed]
to overrule Pilot Life." Id. at 700. See also Smith v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 02-1915 at 7
(E.D.Pa. Sept. 13, 2002) (noting that the "pronouncement in Pilot Life that ERISA provides a com-
prehensive civil enforcement scheme which is intended to be exclusive was left intact and indeed
reinforced by the Court's later opinions in UNUM and Rush."). But see Senoff supra note 193 (stat-
ing that Pilot Life is not as "on point" as some believe because Pilot Life involved bad faith statutes
generally, while Pennsylvania's bad faith statute is directed specifically towards the insurance in-
dustry).
203. See Browstein, supra note 193. At this point, the plaintiff lawyers in both Kirkhuff and
Sprecher are asking for immediate appeals to the Third Circuit. Duffy, supra note 193. In Spre-
cher, the motion is unopposed. Id. Aetna's lawyer, Burt M. Rublin, said in his brief that he be-
lieves immediate appeal makes sense. Id. "The mere fact that this court found preemption to exist,
while a contrary conclusion was reached three weeks earlier.., has itself created uncertainty and
confusion concerning the recurring issue of whether the bad faith statue is preempted by ERISA."
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Despite Newcomer's apparent disregard for the section of the Supreme
Court's decision in Rush addressing conflicts between state laws and
ERISA's civil enforcement provision, the Court's holding is clear: A
state law that relates to an employee benefit plan and allows remedies
outside those provided by ERISA's civil enforcement provision will be
preempted by ERISA. 204  Bad faith statutes directed toward employee
benefit plans, regardless of whether they fall within the saving clause,
will be preempted if they allow remedies outside of ERISA's civil en-
forcement provision.20 5  The bad faith statutes at issue in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania allow punitive damages and thus are clearly
within the province of Pilot Life's rule.2 °6 It is easy to see how statutes
allowing for remedies that closely resemble arbitration-like remedies or
remedies that have an unclear effect on the recovery available to a plain-
tiff may eventually force the Supreme Court to decide a more specific
holding.20 7 However, those statutes are not currently being litigated. In
light of the Rush decision, it seems that Sprecher and Kirkhuff got it
right and Newcomer needs to re-read the Rush decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Both sides of the independent review debate are passionate about
what they feel is or should have been the correct outcome of Rush. One
thing on which we can all agree is that when you or a loved one is ill,
you want to know that you're receiving the best healthcare possible.
Years ago, HMOs seemed to be a way of reducing health care costs
204. Rush, 536 U.S. at 377 (stating that the state insurance regulation would be preempted if it
allows plan participants to obtain remedies that Congress rejected in ERISA). The Court spent a
tremendous amount of time on this section of the opinion and it is hard to understand how Judge
Newcomer could simply disregard eleven full pages of discussion. See id. at 376-387.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 378-380. See supra notes 70-79 regarding the holding in Pilot Life. The Rush
Court also discussed why the Texas tort of wrongful discharge, turning on the employer's motiva-
tion to avoid paying pension benefits, conflicted with ERISA. Id. at 379. The law provided for a
legal remedy of money rather than the purely equitable ones provided in ERISA. Id. The Court
stated, "[a]ny such provision patently violates ERISA's policy of inducing employers to offer bene-
fits by assuring a predictable set of liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a
uniform regime of ultimate remedial orders and awards when a violation has occurred." Id.
207. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 376-387. Laws providing arbitration-like remedies present a much
tougher question in view of the very fine line drawn by the majority in Rush. Id. The line becomes
less clear when considering the dissent's argument that, while § 4-10 does not resemble all aspects
of arbitration, the decision of the independent reviewer is enforceable through a subsequent judicial
action in the same way as arbitration decisions. Id. at 395-96. Furthermore, the dissent argues that
because the Court of Appeals' review was so limited, it has the same effect as an arbitration hearing
and, thus, should be treated like one. Id. Arbitration constitutes an alternative remedy to litigation
and thus conflicts with ERISA. Id. (citing Air Line Pilots v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866 (1998)).
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while still providing quality health care. It is clear that the HMO system
of care has not lived up to its original potential. For years HMOs en-
joyed the discretionary authority to make mixed eligibility and heath
care decisions without justifying their actions to anyone. Finally, states
were forced to regulate HMOs in order to protect patients. Independent
review statutes play a role in evening out the playing field of health care
by allowing patients to obtain a "second opinion" when an HMO denial
seems unreasonable.
An insurance contract is probably the most important contract a
person can ever enter into. It is the only contract that could someday be
the difference between life and death. State independent review statutes
give patients some ability to be sure that they are getting the care guar-
anteed under the contract for which they "bargained." While forcing
HMOs to provide guaranteed care may increase costs, the cost increases
will probably not have a significant link to Rush's decision permitting
state independent review statutes to remain in effect. Potential cost in-
creases are limited by Rush's holding that alternate remedies beyond
those provided in ERISA will not be permitted. This eliminates the fear
of excessive punitive damage awards. Furthermore, Pegram protects
HMOs from suits merely attacking their profit seeking motives.
While the Rush decision will not be the end of the HMO debate,
there is no doubt that it is a small victory for patients who find them-
selves at odds with their HMO. One thing that we should all think about
as we go on to debate the HMO question is: If requiring HMOs to pro-
vide necessary services to patients means that HMOs will not succeed,
then perhaps that is an indication that it never really worked in the first
place.
Stephanie Reinhart
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